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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 First
Amendment-based decisions in both National Institute of Family and
Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees. The Article illustrates how the
rulings in these right-not-to-speak cases deepen the divide on today’s
Court over when a case affecting speech merits heightened First
Amendment analysis (be it strict or intermediate scrutiny) and when it
only deserves rational basis review as an economic or social
regulation. The cases nudge to the breaking point a dangerous game
of push-and-pull between the Court’s conservative and liberal justices
over the scope of free expression that undermines any semblance of
doctrinal coherence. The conservatives are turning more and more
cases into First Amendment battles demanding something greater
than rational basis review. This backs the liberals into a corner,
forcing them to argue that heightened review only applies when “the
true value of protecting freedom of speech” is at stake, such as
facilitating democratic self-governance. In the process, the line
between speech and conduct is blurred while outright animosity
between the Court’s conservative and liberal camps percolates in
opinions.
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and
Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of
Florida in Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D.
(Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D.,
1996, Communication, Stanford University. The author thanks University of Florida
students Hannah Beatty, Jessie Goodman, and Emerson Tyler for reviewing and
critiquing drafts of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court today is sharply divided over when
cases affecting speech trigger traditional heightened levels of First
Amendment1 scrutiny2 and when, instead, they merit only minimal,3
rational basis review.4 Rational basis review is commonly associated
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.” Id. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were
incorporated more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities
and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. See generally Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert & William C. Nevin,
Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the
Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350-60 (2011) (overviewing both
strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence).
Traditional heightened levels of First Amendment review include both strict scrutiny
(for most content-based regulations) and intermediate scrutiny (for most contentneutral regulations and statutes targeting commercial speech). See id. at 358.
3. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 419, 459 (2012) (noting that “minimal scrutiny” is “also referred to as
‘rationality review’” and “functions as a rubber stamp for legislation, providing little
more than a pretense of rationality”).
4. See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis
Test and the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s
Fees, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 999, 1016 (2001). Rational basis review “requires only a
rational relationship between the end (the legitimate governmental objective) and the
means to that end (the statute whose constitutionality is at issue).” Id. Put differently,
a court will declare a law unconstitutional under rational basis review “if it is not
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with economic and social welfare regulations,5 and it typically “plays
an extremely limited role in free speech cases.”6 Specifically, rational
basis review applies when a law imposes only “incidental burdens on
speech”7 or compels the disclosure of purely factual information in
advertisements to prevent deception.8
This Article analyzes how the Court’s 2018 decisions in both
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra9 and Janus
v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees10
bring this growing cleft among the justices into high relief.11 The rift
mirrors the perceived conservative-versus-liberal division among the

rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” Thomas B. Nachbar,
Rational Basis “Plus,” 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 449 (2017).
5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is Constitutional (and
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016) (asserting that “the Court has
basically gotten it right about when to apply the rational basis test—using it to analyze
government economic regulations and social welfare legislation when there is no
discrimination based on a suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental
right”) (emphasis added); Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63
Vill. L. Rev. 79, 79 (2018) (noting that rational basis review is “typically applied to
review of economic and social regulations”).
6. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 787.
7. Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment
Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 156
n.101 (2001).
8. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(holding “that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers”); see also Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the
Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (observing that the test in
Zauderer is “akin to rational basis review”). The Court also applies a variation of
rational basis review in cases involving the speech of public-school students that is
sponsored by the school or that is part of the curriculum. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281 (1988). Specifically, the Court has held “that educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273. As Dean
Erwin Chemerinsky observes, this “is the classic phrasing of the rational basis
review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013).
9. See generally Nat’l Instit. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018).
10. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S.
Ct. 2448 (2018).
11. See infra Sections III.B-C (analyzing, respectively, Becerra and Janus).
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current justices.12 Exposed earlier in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,13 the
conflict is highly significant. Why? Because the standard of scrutiny
applied in a First Amendment case often affects its outcome.14 The
outcome, in turn, frequently causes an immediate real-world impact,
as it has for labor unions in the aftermath of Janus.15
Perhaps even more disconcerting for some First Amendment
traditionalists, the current cleavage on scrutiny jeopardizes the

12. See infra Part II (examining decisions rendered before a successor to
Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the Court). It considers Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch to be conservative,
and it categorizes Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Elena Kagan as liberals. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Conservatives in
Charge: Supreme Court Moved to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017term-moved-right.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fadamliptak&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=strea
m_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=145&pgtype=collection
[https://perma.cc/7Q4V-EWHF] (describing the “four-member liberal wing” as
comprised of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena
Kagan; identifying the Court’s “most conservative members” as Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito; noting that Neil Gorsuch “returned the [C]ourt to full strength and to a
conservative majority” after the death of Antonin Scalia; and adding that Chief Justice
John Roberts is moving more to the Court’s ideological center); Mark Walsh, Center
Court, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2018, at 20, http://dashboard.mazsystems.com/
webreader/57538?page=22 [https://perma.cc/M3B3-VBJ8] (suggesting that it is
likely Chief Justice John Roberts will become, after the retirement of Justice Anthony
Kennedy at the end of July 2018, the Court’s new “median justice” who is “at its
ideological center, as measured by political scientists who study the court”).
13. See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Part I
(addressing Sorrell in detail).
14. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015). For
instance, the Court recently observed that “a speech restriction withstands strict
scrutiny” only in “rare cases.” Id. Or as former Justice David Souter once put it, “strict
scrutiny leaves few survivors.” City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
425, 455 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 305 (1997) (observing that “the
Court’s free speech analysis has become dominated by tiers, with at least the highest
and lowest tiers being largely outcome-determinative”); Clay Calvert, Beyond
Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices’ Evolution on Free Speech, 20162017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 48 (asserting that “a statute is more likely to be struck
down under strict scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny”).
15. See Kris Maher, Unions Take a Hit After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unions-take-a-hitafter-supreme-court-ruling-1533466800 [https://perma.cc/JRB9-H58C] (reporting
that “[p]ublic-sector unions are facing steep falls in revenue and trying to prevent the
loss of members in the wake of” the Court’s ruling in Janus and describing “the first
signs of how the high court’s decision is hitting union coffers”).
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dichotomy between speech and conduct.16 Under this distinction,
conduct—unless it is deemed expressive conduct or symbolic
expression,17 such as burning the American flag in protest18—receives
no First Amendment scrutiny.19 Put slightly differently, a contrast
between speech and conduct “must be drawn under current law
because the law subjects speech regulation to higher levels of scrutiny
than economic regulation.”20
This “fundamental distinction between speech and
conduct”21 today is openly questioned by liberal-leaning Justice
Stephen Breyer.22 He asserted in 2017 in Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman23 that “virtually all government regulation affects
speech” and that “it is often wiser not to try to distinguish between
‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’”24 In stark contrast, conservative Justice
Clarence Thomas25 wrote in 2018 in National Institute of Family &
16. See Diahann Dasilva, Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying
Expression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56
B.C. L. REV. 767, 769-70 (2015) (noting “the speech versus conduct dichotomy,” and
examining “the distinction between speech and conduct, the implications of that
distinction, and how courts have classified various activities as speech or conduct”).
17. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment
affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”).
18. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
19. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that “a general law regulating conduct and not specifically
directed at expression . . . is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all”).
20. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for the First Amendment, 41 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 45 (2018).
21. Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic
Skepticism and the Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015).
22. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Trump Makes His Pick, but It’s Still Anthony
Kennedy’s
Supreme
Court,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trump-makes-his-pick-but-itsstill-anthony-kennedys-supreme-court/2017/01/31/1de12472-e7e0-11e6-bf6f01b6b443624_story.html?utm_term=.3e49a22f69a8
[https://perma.cc/7DSWASFK] (identifying Breyer as one “of the court’s four liberals”); see also Richard
Wolf & Herb Jackson, Supreme Court Could Make Sports-Betting Ban an Underdog,
USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2017, 1:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2017/12/04/supreme-court-could-make-sports-betting-banunderdog/919347001/ [https://perma.cc/FBY8-Z64H] (identifying Breyer as “one of
the court’s four liberals”).
23. See generally Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144
(2017).
24. Id. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rules for Christian Cake
Baker but Voices Support for Gay Rights Too, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-baker-wedding-20180604story.html
[https://perma.cc/9QMU-GBZQ]
(identifying
Thomas
as
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Life Advocates v. Becerra that “[w]hile drawing the line between
speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long
drawn it.”26 In other words, while Breyer gives short shrift to the
speech–conduct dichotomy, Thomas willingly enforces it.27
The boundary is now tremendously blurred between what
Thomas in Becerra called laws regulating “speech as speech”28 and
what Breyer, writing for a four-justice dissent in the same dispute,
called those affecting “ordinary social and economic legislation.”29
The conservative and liberal justices simply do not see eye-to-eye on
the issue and therefore disagree about the constitutionality of multiple
laws impacting free expression.30
In Becerra, California’s regulation of speech at licensed crisis
pregnancy centers fell into the former speech-as-speech category for
the five-justice conservative majority.31 This, in turn, triggered
heightened First Amendment review and led the majority to conclude
that the petitioners attacking the law were “likely to succeed on the
merits of their challenge.”32 Conversely, the four-justice liberal dissent
“[c]onservative”); see also Richard Wolf, Justice Anthony Kennedy to Retire,
Opening Supreme Court Seat for President Trump, USA TODAY (June 27, 2018, 6:32
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/27/justice-kennedyretiring-opening-supreme-court-seat/952716001/
[https://perma.cc/V4NB-4373]
(describing Thomas as “ultra-conservative”).
26. Nat’l Instit. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2373 (2018).
27. Compare Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the speech-conduct dichotomy should not be made), with
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (supporting the speech-conduct dichotomy in a majority
opinion authored by Justice Thomas).
28. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374.
29. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., id. (finding by the more conservative majority that the speechconduct dichotomy should remain versus the more liberal dissenters finding that the
speech-conduct dichotomy is not useful).
31. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (“The licensed notice regulates speech as
speech.”); see Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123472(a)(1) (West 2016). Specifically,
the California statute required such licensed facilities to post a notice stating:
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to
comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of
contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether
you qualify, contact the county social services office at [insert the telephone
number].” Id.
32. Id. at 2376. “[T]he licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate
scrutiny. California asserts a single interest to justify the licensed notice: providing
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services. Assuming that
this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to
achieve it.” Id. at 2375.
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found the statute fit into the latter social legislation category and thus
was subject to a deferential approach of reasonableness under which
it was “likely constitutional.”33
In Janus, the five-justice conservative majority reasoned that
“[f]undamental free speech rights”34 were threatened by a state law
that compelled public employees who were not union members to pay
agency or fair-share fees to support the collective bargaining activities
of the union that exclusively represented them.35 In striking down the
law, the majority flatly rejected the notion that rational basis review
should apply in analyzing the statute’s constitutionality.36 Justice
Samuel Alito explained for the majority that “[b]ecause the compelled
subsidization of private speech seriously impinge[d] on First
Amendment rights, it [could not] be casually allowed.”37
In contrast, the Janus dissenters contended that “government
entities have substantial latitude to regulate their employees’
speech.”38 As Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the dissent, the Court
typically has an attitude “of respect—even solicitude—for the
government’s prerogatives as an employer. So long as the government
is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting the employment
relationship for other ends—it has a wide berth, comparable to that of
a private employer.”39 She criticized the majority for violating the
Court’s “usual deferential approach” and, in the process, “turning
33. Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court has adopted a “respectful approach to economic and social
legislation when a First Amendment claim like the claim present here is at issue”); id.
at 2381-87 (observing that “[h]istorically, the Court has been wary of claims that
regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the
Constitution”; noting that the government historically has been able to impose
“reasonable requirements” and “reasonable conditions” on such activities (including
those of medical professionals); and concluding that when it comes to laws requiring
medical professionals to disclose factual information, “[t]here is no reason to subject
such laws to heightened scrutiny”).
34. Janus v. Am. Fed’n St., Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460
(2018).
35. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/6(e) (2013) (providing that non-union
employees may be required to pay “their proportionate share of the costs of the
collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting
wages, hours and other conditions of employment”); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2489 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (noting that agency fees are “now often called fair-share fees”).
36. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465 (majority opinion) (“This form of minimal
scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it here.”).
37. Id. at 2464.
38. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2493.
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the First Amendment into a sword” to attack “workaday economic and
regulatory policy.”40
Lurking beneath this scrutiny schism in Becerra and Janus is an
effort by some liberal justices to confine the scope of heightened First
Amendment protection to only cases in which, as Justice Breyer wrote
in Becerra, certain “First Amendment goals” are served and when “the
true value of protecting freedom of speech” is at stake.41 Echoing
Breyer’s sentiment, Justice Kagan wrote for the dissent in Janus that
instead of applying heightened and “aggressive” First Amendment
scrutiny to “workaday economic and regulatory policy,” “[t]he First
Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to
undermine but to protect democratic governance—including over the
role of public-sector unions.”42 Put differently, just because a law
involves speech does not mean that it always triggers weighty First
Amendment concerns.
In 2015 in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Justice Kagan also suggested
that strict scrutiny does not always apply when evaluating the
constitutionality of content-based sign ordinances because “the
vindication of First Amendment values” does not require usage of that
level of scrutiny.43 Such a values-based approach for determining
scrutiny differs from the Court’s long-standing general method44 and

40. Id. at 2494, 2501.
41. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 238283 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501-02 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
43. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2239 (2015) (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
44. See Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a PostReed Landscape, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 125 (2017) (noting that the Court has
used the distinction between “content-neutral vs. content-specific” laws “for almost
half a century” in order “to assign judicial standards of review to regulations on
expression”). The doctrinal roots trace back to the Court’s decision in Police
Department of City of Chicago v. Mosely. See 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). In Mosely, the
Court observed that “above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content.” Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Playing Favorites? Justice Scalia,
Abortion Protests, and Judicial Impartiality, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 23, 27
(2016) (“The Court applies a much more stringent test to speech restrictions that relate
to content. The content distinction found its first clear expression in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley.”).
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“default rule”45 of initially deciding if a law is content based or content
neutral in order to then determine the correct standard of scrutiny.46
The idea that the value of speech determines the level of scrutiny
is embraced by First Amendment scholars such as former Yale Law
School Dean Robert Post.47 As Post contends, “First Amendment
coverage is triggered by those forms of social interaction that
realize First Amendment values.”48 All of this harkens back to
considerations of high and low-value speech embraced by the Court
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and the accompanying notion that
low-value categories of speech either receive no First Amendment
protection or “can be regulated on the basis of their content without
having to satisfy strict scrutiny.”49
45. David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY
L.J. 359, 367-68 (2015) (observing that “First Amendment doctrine has evolved into
a mix of rule-like approaches, like the default rule that content-based speech
restrictions are evaluated under strict scrutiny, and standard-like approaches, like the
intermediate scrutiny standard applied to content-neutral speech restrictions”).
46. As Professor Leslie Kendrick encapsulates the traditional approach:
After distinguishing content-based from content-neutral laws, the Court
must give each its appropriate level of review. This is the scrutiny analysis.
Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves
fatal. Meanwhile, content-neutral laws receive what the Court calls
“intermediate scrutiny,” in practice a highly deferential form of review
which virtually all laws pass.
Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012)
(emphasis omitted). Professor Genevieve Lakier echoes Kendrick’s description,
putting it this way:
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of
speech is one of the most important in First Amendment law. For decades
now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that
restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are
presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can
satisfy strict scrutiny. In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that regulate
speech for some reason other than its content—are reviewed under a lesser,
and often quite deferential, standard.
Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the
Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (2016).
47. Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 181-82 (2015) (“Different kinds of speech embody different
constitutional values, and each kind of speech should receive constitutional
protections appropriate to the value it embodies.”).
48. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000).
49. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 2166, 2171 (2015); see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73
(1942). In Chaplinksy, the Court wrote that some categories of speech serve “no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
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The subjectivity, however, of an approach limiting elevated First
Amendment review to cases affecting the “true value” of free
expression and confining its reach to “better things” such as
“democratic governance” profoundly impacts extant First
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, does this tack mean that
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n in 2011 was wrongly
decided?50 The Court there applied strict scrutiny to strike down a
California law and, in doing so, protected the First Amendment rights
of children to play violent video games.51
On its face, the “true value”—whatever that nebulous concept
means—of protecting free expression seemingly has nothing to do
with either shielding violent video games or safeguarding minors’
access to them.52 Similarly, Justice Kagan might reasonably find that
“[t]he First Amendment was meant for better things” than protecting
violent video games, which arguably do not serve her focus on
“protect[ing] democratic governance.”53 Should, then, Brown be
overruled under this approach? It is worth recalling that Breyer, in
fact, dissented in Brown and would have held California’s violent
video game statute constitutional.54
Likewise, would public indecency laws targeting nude
dancing—a form of conduct now recognized as symbolic expression
protected by the First Amendment55—in sexually oriented businesses
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see also Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 194 (1983) (noting that “[t]he ‘low’ value theory first appeared in the famous
dictum of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire”).
50. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
51. See id. at 799 (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of
protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict
scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”); id. at 789, 794-95 (addressing the First
Amendment rights of minors). The statute at issue in Brown banned “the sale or rental
of ‘violent video games’ to minors.” Id. at 789.
52. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2383
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Janus v. Am. Fed’n St., Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting)
54. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment
affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”);
see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000) (holding nude dancing “is
expressive conduct that is entitled to some quantum of protection under the First
Amendment”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (concluding

Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case?

83

no longer be subject to intermediate scrutiny?56 Should nude dancing
regulations, instead, simply be reviewed under a rational basis
standard? To the extent that such laws target only the secondary
effects of nude dancing,57 “such as the impacts on public health, safety,
and welfare,”58 they typically have been considered content-neutral
regulations59 subject to the intermediate scrutiny test of United States
v. O’Brien.60
But if Justice Breyer is correct that courts should not focus on
the distinction between speech and conduct,61 and if public indecency
statutes really amount to what he calls “ordinary social and economic
regulation” rather than laws targeting free expression, and if
safeguarding nude dancing does not represent what Breyer calls “the
true value of protecting freedom of speech,” then it seems that rational
basis review—not intermediate scrutiny—should apply.62 Similarly,
might Justice Kagan find that regulating nude dancing to address
health, safety, and welfare issues amounts to a “workaday economic
that nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”).
56. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-72 (applying the four-part test developed by
the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
57. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that secondary effects of speech are
ones “unrelated to the impact of the speech on its audience”). When it comes to the
zoning of sexually oriented businesses, “secondary effects have most often included
alleged increases in crime, decreases in property values, and other indicators of
neighborhood deterioration in the area surrounding the adult business.” Bryant Paul,
Daniel Linz & Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses
Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative
Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 356 (2001).
58. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 292.
59. Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects
Analysis and the Quiet Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
1187, 1201 (2013) (“The development of the secondary effects doctrine . . . permits
laws that are clearly content based to be treated as content neutral in certain
circumstances.”).
60. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 293-99; see also John Fee, The Pornographic
Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 292 (2009) (noting that under the
secondary effects doctrine, “a regulation will be treated as content-neutral and subject
to intermediate scrutiny, despite its content-discriminatory form, if the primary
purpose of the regulation is to control the secondary effects rather than the primary
effects of speech”).
61. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152
(2017) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t is often wiser not to try to distinguish between
‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’”).
62. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381,
2383 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and regulatory policy” and that “[t]he First Amendment was meant for
better things” than protecting nude dancing inside of sexually oriented
businesses?63
Speculatively speaking, the latent political desires in 2018 of
both the conservative and liberal justices pushed an already shaky and
unstable First Amendment methodology over scrutiny to an
exceedingly dangerous place.64 It is a place where deciding when a
case involving speech constitutes a true First Amendment-based
dispute demanding heightened review and when, in contrast, it
amounts to a mere economic regulation requiring only rational basis
evaluation is anything but clear. More specifically—and in the starkest
and, admittedly, the most stereotypical of terms—the conservative
justices, in attempting to protect pro-life organizations in Becerra and
deplete the cash coffers of unions in Janus, have created the potential
for turning any regulation that affects a specific content category of
speech into a First Amendment battle involving either strict or
intermediate scrutiny review.
In a nutshell, this is what Justice Kagan meant in her Janus
dissent when she castigated the conservative majority for
“weaponizing the First Amendment.”65 Breyer too evoked the
weaponization argument in his Becerra dissent.66 Furthermore, it is
what concerns a bevy of legal scholars67 who, as Professors Jane and
Derek Bambauer encapsulate it, fear “a new free speech
63. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501,
2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
64. Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of
Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v.
Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 509 (2012) (“First Amendment free speech doctrine
can be mystifying because it has never really settled in on a consistent analytical
methodology.”).
65. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Medical
professionals do not, generally speaking, have a right to use the Constitution as a
weapon allowing them rigorously to control the content of those reasonable
conditions.”).
67. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil
Rights Movement, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 22 (2016) (“I remain concerned that this
expansive First Amendment will prove to be an unworkable burden on beneficial
regulation intended to protect public health, safety, and welfare.”); see also Post &
Shanor, supra note 47, at 166-67 (“Across the country, plaintiffs are using the First
Amendment to challenge commercial regulations, in matters ranging from public
health to data privacy. It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has
become a powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are
palpable.”).
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Lochnerism—an exploitation of the First Amendment to promote a
broad deregulatory agenda, regardless of popular democratic will.”68
Put differently, the worry is “that free speech claims could be launched
against every conceivable governmental regulation, potentially
destroying the modern regulatory state.”69 In this critique, as Professor
Margot Kaminski notes, “the First Amendment has become a blunt
tool of deregulation.”70
Much of this line of scholarly critique focuses on how, in cases
such as Sorrell, corporations exploit the First Amendment for
deregulatory ends.71 Although the results in both Becerra and Janus
reflect the trend of “deregulatory First Amendment cases,”72 neither
involved a big-business corporate plaintiff seeking to strike down a
regulation directly affecting its products, services, or marketing.73 In
brief, the conservative justices in both Becerra and Janus extended
their alleged assault on regulatory frameworks via different
protagonists (or, perhaps, antagonists). That, in short, is the critique
against the conservative justices.
But what about the flip side? The liberal justices, in attempting
to facilitate pro-choice speech and enhance access to abortions in
Becerra and to maintain funding for unions in Janus, have threatened
to reduce First Amendment scrutiny to rational basis review unless the
speech at issue serves a “true value” with which the First Amendment
is concerned or amorphously “better things” such as “protect[ing]
68. Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 337 (2017); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905)
(declaring unconstitutional, as an interference with the right to contract under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute limiting the number of
hours that a baker could work).
69. Bambauer & Baumbauer, supra note 68, at 342; see also Morgan N.
Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (2017) (noting that “today
litigants—often corporate litigants—increasingly use the First Amendment to
prioritize new applications of the freedom of speech over regulations designed to
protect consumers and citizens”).
70. Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV.
167, 172 (2017).
71. See Piety, supra note 67, at 1 (“The last twenty years have seen the
development of a remarkable expansion of the First Amendment to business
enterprises. The First Amendment has become a powerful weapon against regulation
of all kinds.”).
72. Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323 (2016).
73. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018).
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democratic governance.”74 This tack arguably reeks of subjectivity
about values and supposedly better things that muddies any semblance
of coherence in an already “tumultuous doctrinal sea.”75
It all, then, amounts to a treacherous push-and-pull situation. In
brief, the more the conservative justices push for applying heightened
First Amendment scrutiny to regulations harming speech interests, the
more the liberal justices attempt—even with little more at their
disposal than the parade-of-horribles rhetoric one expects from
blistering dissents76—to pull the reins back on which regulations
deserve elevated First Amendment review. It is a dangerous judicial
game of chicken played by both sides, threatening a foundation of First
Amendment jurisprudence. If little else, as this Article later suggests,
it creates space for Justice Breyer’s desired proportionality review to
eventually take root among the doctrinal ruins.77
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.78 Sorrell provides a crucial basis for better
understanding today’s friction over when a statute affecting speech
merits heightened scrutiny and when, in contrast, it deserves
deferential review as an ordinary piece of economic or commercial
legislation. Sorrell, importantly, was disparaged by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor in 2018 in Janus for how it has been used and, arguably,
abused by the Court.79 That is especially noteworthy because
Sotomayor voted with, as the lone liberal, a bloc of conservative
justices in Sorrell to apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny in
that case.80 Colloquially put, Sotomayor in Janus saw the error of her
74. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
75. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000).
76. See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In accord
with a parade-of-horribles attack, Justice Breyer asserted in his Becerra dissent that
“the majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the
constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government regulation.” Id. He added
that “the majority’s view, if taken literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps
placing much securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk,
depending on how broadly its exceptions are interpreted.” Id.
77. See infra Part II (addressing Breyer’s embracement of proportionality)
78. See infra Part I (discussing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.); see generally
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
79. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although I joined
the majority in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., . . . I disagree with the way that this Court
has since interpreted and applied that opinion.”).
80. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 556 (identifying the justices voting in the
majority and dissent).

Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case?

87

ways in Sorrell.81 Additionally, Sorrell merits special attention here
because Justice Elena Kagan, in penning the dissent in Janus, singled
it out as an example of a case in which “the Court has wielded the First
Amendment in such an aggressive way.”82
Part II describes Justice Breyer’s repeated denigration of the
Court’s embrace of traditional First Amendment doctrines relating to
standards of scrutiny, further laying the groundwork for today’s
disagreement on the Court.83 Part III then analyzes, in greater depth
and detail, key aspects of the Court’s decisions in three very recent
cases—Expressions Hair Design, Becerra, and Janus.84 Viewed
collectively, this trio of cases lays bare the fault line separating the
justices on standards of scrutiny and when a case affecting speech
merits rigorous First Amendment review. Finally, Part IV concludes
by proposing and exploring several different paths that the Court could
now take in determining the level of scrutiny that applies in a case
implicating speech.85
I. SORRELL PAVES THE PATH TOWARD TODAY’S FRICTION: LOOKING
BACK AT A WEDGE-ISSUE CASE
In 2011, a fractured U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc. declared unconstitutional a Vermont statute that banned
pharmacies from selling information about the prescription practices
of identifiable physicians to purchasers for use in marketing.86 The law
also barred pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers—namely,
drug salespeople known as detailers87—from using prescriber

81. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Sotomayor’s
vote with the conservatives in Sorrell may be perceived as an outlier, as Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky notes that she “has been predictably with the liberals” since joining the
nation’s high court. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Senate Can Demand Answers from Brett
Kavanaugh. If He Isn’t Honest, He Shouldn’t Be Confirmed, L.A. TIMES (July 11,
2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinskykavanaugh-confirmation-questions-20180711-story.html [https://perma.cc/NZ4DK2NR].
82. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
83. See infra Part II (detailing Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach).
84. See infra Part III (discussing the key decisions in Expressions Hair
Design, Becerra, and Janus).
85. See infra Part IV (providing different options for the Court to consider).
86. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557-63 (2011) (describing
the statute, the legislative intent behind it and Vermont’s interpretation of it).
87. See id. at 557-58 (describing detailing and the work of detailers on behalf
of pharmaceutical manufacturers).
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information in marketing.88 In a nutshell, pharmacies in Vermont
could freely share information about physicians’ prescribing practices
“with anyone for any reason” unless the information was “to be used
for marketing.”89
A key purpose behind the statute was “to diminish the
effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”90
The law attempted to do this by “preventing detailers—and only
detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and
informative manner.”91 Vermont asserted this was important because
it ostensibly would lower costs by allowing generic alternatives to
brand-name drugs to compete more fairly in the face of otherwise
“expensive pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors.”92 In
other words, because “detailers who use prescriber-identifying
information are effective in promoting brand-name drugs,” blocking
this flow of information would supposedly level the playing field for
less expensive alternative drugs.93
Ultimately, the outcome in Sorrell “hinged on what level of First
Amendment scrutiny the Supreme Court would apply to the Vermont
law.”94 The division, in turn, among the conservative and liberal
justices over the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to that law
foreshadows today’s tension in cases such as Becerra and Janus.95
Anthony Kennedy penned the six-justice majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, Samuel Alito and a lone liberal, Sonia Sotomayor.96 The
majority concluded the Vermont statute was subject to “heightened
judicial scrutiny” under the First Amendment because it “impose[d]
burdens that [were] based on the content of speech and that [were]

88. See id. at 563 (noting that the law “bars pharmaceutical manufacturers
and detailers from using the information for marketing”).
89. Id. at 572.
90. Id. at 565.
91. Id. at 564.
92. Id. at 576, 580 (quoting 2007 Vt. Laws No. 80, § 1(4)).
93. Id. at 578.
94. Marcia M. Boumil et al., Prescription Data Mining, Medical Privacy and
the First Amendment: The U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 21
ANNALS HEALTH L. 447, 448 (2012).
95. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018); Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018).
96. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 556.
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aimed at a particular viewpoint.”97 How did the law impose such
burdens? Kennedy explained that:
[The statute] disfavor[ed] marketing, that is, speech with a particular
content. More than that, the statute disfavor[ed] specific speakers, namely
pharmaceutical manufacturers. As a result of th[o]se content- and speakerbased rules, detailers [could not] obtain prescriber-identifying information,
even though the information [could] be purchased or acquired by other
speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints. Detailers [were] likewise
barred from using the information for marketing, even though the
information [could] be used by a wide range of other speakers.98

The majority rejected Vermont’s argument that heightened
scrutiny was “unwarranted because its law [was] a mere commercial
regulation.”99 Kennedy acknowledged that “the First Amendment does
not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from
imposing incidental burdens on speech.”100 Yet he concluded that
Vermont’s law “impose[d] more than an incidental burden on
protected expression.”101 Kennedy reasoned here that the statute did
not “simply have an effect on speech, but [was] directed at certain
content and [was] aimed at particular speakers.”102 In brief, because
the law imposes “a content- and speaker-based burden,” it “require[d]
heightened judicial scrutiny.”103
“[I]ncidental burden”104—or a very close phrasing, namely
“incidental effect,” which is used by the Court when sussing out
whether a statute is content neutral105—thus is a crucial, yet highly
elastic concept.106 It can be stretched or contracted to suit a desired
outcome.107 Indeed, as noted below,108 the Sorrell dissent—in contrast
97. Id. at 565.
98. Id. at 564.
99. Id. at 566.
100. Id. at 567.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 570.
104. Id. at 567.
105. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“A regulation
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if
it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”) (emphasis
added).
106. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996) (discussing laws imposing incidental burdens
trigger more deferential judicial scrutiny).
107. See generally id. (providing a comprehensive review of the meaning and
importance of the concept of incidental burdens in federal constitutional law).
108. Infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (addressing the Sorrell
dissent).
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to the majority—found the burden on speech imposed by Vermont’s
statute to be “indirect, incidental, and entirely commercial.”109
Furthermore, the majority clearly disliked the fact that Vermont
manipulated the marketplace of ideas110 for factual and truthful
information about pharmaceutical products simply because the
regulated speech was, in the government’s opinion, too influential and
persuasive.111 As Kennedy wrote in wrapping up the majority opinion,
Vermont “burdened a form of protected expression that it found too
persuasive. At the same time, the State ha[d] left unburdened those
speakers whose messages [were] in accord with its own views. This
the State [could not] do.”112 Put differently, Vermont could not
“hamstring”113 the speech of detailers when the proper remedy at its
disposal was counterspeech.114 More specifically, the state could
express “through its own speech” its displeasure “that detailers who
use prescriber-identifying information are effective in promoting
109.
110.

Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT
THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). The marketplace of
ideas theory is “one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers
and for laypersons.” See id. It pivots on the assumption that free speech “contributes
to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). In fact, “much
of First Amendment jurisprudence rests” on “[t]he hypothetical construct of a
marketplace of ideas.” Catherine J. Ross, Incredible Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 377,
382 (2018).
111. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570 (“Facts, after all, are the beginning point for
much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct
human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information
is speech for First Amendment purposes.”); id. at 579 (“The State nowhere contends
that detailing is false or misleading within the meaning of this Court’s First
Amendment precedents.”); id. at 578 (“That the State finds expression too persuasive
does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”). The majority
emphasized that the free flow of information “has great relevance in the fields of
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.” Id. at 566.
112. Id. at 580.
113. Id. at 578.
114. Justice Louis Brandeis explained the counterspeech doctrine more than
ninety years ago, contending that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert,
Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU
L. REV. 553, 553-54 (“Rather than censor allegedly harmful speech and thereby risk
violating the First Amendment protection of expression, or file a lawsuit that threatens
to punish speech perceived as harmful, the preferred remedy is to add more speech to
the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.”).
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brand-name drugs.”115 The majority thus found the statute violated the
First Amendment,116 regardless of whether the intermediate scrutiny
standard that typically applies in commercial speech cases117 or a
higher standard applied.118
In summary, under the majority’s approach in Sorrell,
heightened scrutiny applies when a law imposes more than an
incidental burden on speech, regardless of whether the law regulates
commerce. Something more than an incidental burden exists when a
law “is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular
speakers.”119 A law, in turn, is directed at certain content when it is
enacted because the government disagrees with the message being
conveyed.120
In contrast, the three-justice dissent—authored by Justice
Stephen Breyer and joined by fellow liberal Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Elena Kagan—concluded that the statute’s “effect on
expression [was] inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort
to regulate a commercial enterprise. The First Amendment does not
require courts to apply a special ‘heightened’ standard of review when
115. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578.
116. Id. at 557 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. As a
consequence, Vermont’s statute must be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. The
law cannot satisfy that standard.”).
117. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the government may regulate
truthful and non-misleading advertisements for lawful goods and services if it has a
substantial interest that is directly advanced by the law in question and if the law is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980). The Central Hudson test represents
an intermediate scrutiny standard. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures,
65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2014) (noting that “the Supreme Court differentiates
between commercial speech (such as advertising) and noncommercial speech, and
subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny”); Levi, supra note 8, at 681, n.172 (2015)
(noting that in Central Hudson, the Court articulated “a four-pronged standard of
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech”); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech
and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 198 (2015) (describing “the
intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. [sic] v. Public
Service Commission”).
118. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (“As in previous cases, however, the outcome
is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial
scrutiny is applied.”).
119. Id. at 567.
120. Id. at 566 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)) (“The First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the
government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message
it conveys.’”).
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reviewing such an effort.”121 Under both this deferential tack and the
intermediate scrutiny standard applicable in commercial speech
cases,122 the dissent declared Vermont’s law constitutional.123 As
Breyer summed it up, “whether we apply an ordinary commercial
speech standard or a less demanding standard, I believe Vermont’s law
is consistent with the First Amendment.”124
In accord with his penchant for a proportionality approach to
cases affecting free speech,125 Breyer deemed the key issue in Sorrell
to be “whether Vermont’s regulatory provisions work[ed] harm
to First Amendment interests that [was] disproportionate to their
furtherance of legitimate regulatory objectives.”126 Reflecting the
deference due to the government under this methodology, Breyer
wrote that he “would give significant weight to legitimate commercial
regulatory objectives.”127 In the dissent’s view, the Court should “defer
significantly to legislative judgment” when “ordinary commercial or
regulatory legislation . . . affects speech in less direct ways.”128
The notion of ordinariness reflected in Breyer’s phrase “ordinary
commercial or regulatory legislation” in the sentence immediately
above was pivotal for framing the dissent’s analysis.129 In fact, Breyer
in Sorrell also used the phrases “ordinary economic regulatory
121. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
122. Id. (“And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard
this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial
speech.”).
123. See id. As Breyer wrote, “I believe that the statute before us satisfies the
‘intermediate’ standards this Court has applied to restrictions on commercial speech.
A fortiori it satisfies less demanding standards that are more appropriately applied in
this kind of commercial regulatory case.” Id. at 602.
124. Id. at 603.
125. See, e.g., Jeffery C. Barnum, Encouraging Congress to Encourage
Speech: Reflections on United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 527, 546-48 (2012)
(addressing Breyer’s proportionality approach and calling it “vexing for lawmakers
because it is difficult to know when the balance tips towards constitutionality”); see
also Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Pragmatism, the Supreme Court, and Democratic
Revolution, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 652 (2012) (noting that Breyer “advocates
proportionality analysis, or balancing, as how the Court should candidly weigh state
versus individual interests”); Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech
Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495, 519 (2015) (contending that
proportionality review “contextualizes the relevant factors at play in the litigation to
determine whether the restriction on speech outweighs the government’s important
interest”).
126. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 582 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 584.
129. Id.
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programs,” “ordinary regulatory programs” and “ordinary regulatory
means.”130 This foreshadowed his 2018 dissent in Becerra where, as
noted in the Introduction, Breyer used the phrase “ordinary economic
and social legislation,” as well as “ordinary social and economic
regulation,” and “ordinary disclosure laws.”131
For the Sorrell dissent, the Vermont law fit cleanly within the
scope of such an ordinary regulatory program.132 As Breyer explained,
Sorrell was “a case where the government [sought] typical regulatory
ends (lower drug prices, more balanced sales messages) through the
use of ordinary regulatory means (limiting the commercial use of data
gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate). The speech-related
consequences here [were] indirect, incidental, and entirely
commercial.”133
In addition to foreshadowing the division among the
conservative and liberal justices in 2018 in Becerra and Janus on
whether a statute affecting speech triggers heightened First
Amendment scrutiny, Sorrell also presaged Breyer’s parade-ofhorribles warning about a virtual deregulatory tsunami in his Becerra
dissent.134 Specifically, Breyer wrote in Sorrell that the majority’s
logic at best “opens a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges
to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect
a commercial message . . . . At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s preNew Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decision
making where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”135 In brief,
the specter of returning to Lochner v. New York animated Breyer’s
logic in Sorrell.136
130. Id. at 584, 602.
131. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 238081 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. See infra notes 310-311 and accompanying text.
135. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. On this point, Breyer contended in Sorrell that:
[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon
commercial messages, the Court’s vision of its reviewing task threatens to
return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its
interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power was much
abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic theories
preferred by individual jurists . . . . By inviting courts to scrutinize whether
a State’s legitimate regulatory interests can be achieved in less restrictive
ways whenever they touch (even indirectly) upon commercial speech,
today’s majority risks repeating the mistakes of the past in a manner not
anticipated by our precedents.
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In Becerra, Breyer reiterated this concern about opening the
floodgates of deregulation-targeted litigation.137 He wrote that “the
majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over
the constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government
regulation.”138 Breyer also came back to his Lochner theme in Becerra,
opining that “[i]n the name of the First Amendment, the majority today
treads into territory where the pre-New Deal, as well as the post-New
Deal, Court refused to go.”139
For the Sorrell dissent, then, the majority’s invocation of
heightened First Amendment scrutiny in similar cases vests the
judiciary with a too-powerful weapon for intruding on the regulatory
province of the legislative branch in commercial and economic
matters.140 “Because the imposition of ‘heightened’ scrutiny in such
instances would significantly change the legislative/judicial balance,
in a way that would significantly weaken the legislature’s authority to
regulate commerce and industry, I would not apply a ‘heightened’
First Amendment standard of review in this case,” Justice Breyer
wrote.141 The proper remedy for those upset by laws like the one at
issue in Sorrell—at least for the dissent—is not a heightened First
Amendment challenge.142 Instead, it is either better lobbying of current
legislators to change the existing laws or to vote those legislators out
of office in favor of ones who will embrace different policies.143
Courts, in the dissent’s view, should only intervene when economicoriented statutes like those at issue in Sorrell lack any rationality.144
Professor Tamara Piety concurs with the dissent’s analysis,
contending that Sorrell “strikes at the heart of the government’s ability

Id. at 591-92 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
137. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2382.
140. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 592 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. (“Nothing in Vermont’s statute undermines the ability of persons
opposing the State’s policies to speak their mind or to pursue a different set of policy
objectives through the democratic process.”).
144. Id. (“This does not mean that economic regulation having some effect on
speech is always lawful. Courts typically review the lawfulness of statutes for
rationality and of regulations (if federal) to make certain they are not ‘arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.’”).
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to regulate commerce.”145 As she puts it, the majority’s approach
“transforms a fairly prosaic regulation of commerce into what sounds
like a civil rights case.”146 Indeed, she adds that “[r]eading the opinion
one might be forgiven for thinking that this was a civil rights case
rather than an issue of regulated pharmaceutical sales practices.”147
The implications of this approach, as Professor Charlotte Garden
notes, are that it “enables new arguments that . . . heightened scrutiny
should apply to regulation targeting a particular set of commercial
actors who are doing business via speech.”148
Read more broadly, Sorrell falls in line with what attorney
Richard Samp calls “a remarkable trend in First Amendment
jurisprudence over the past 30 years. In recent years, the Court’s
conservative justices have been far more likely than its liberal ones to
strike down government speech restrictions on First Amendment
grounds.”149 And if, as Professor Amanda Shanor notes, “the First
Amendment has become the key battleground for challenging the
powers of the modern administrative state,”150 then Sorrell marks a key
successful challenge that, as Part III reveals, paves that path for the
2018 decisions in both Becerra and Janus.151
II. TIERS OF SCRUTINY UNDER ATTACK: JUSTICE BREYER’S
PROPORTIONALITY APPROACH
Adding to the confusion over when a case involving speech
merits heightened scrutiny and when it entails only rational basis
review is Justice Stephen Breyer’s First Amendment philosophy.
Breyer, who penned both the 2011 dissent in Sorrell discussed
above152 and the 2018 dissent in Becerra addressed below,153 views

145. Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of
Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012).
146. Id. at 4-5.
147. Id. at 15.
148. Garden, supra note 72, at 337.
149. Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or
Resurrecting Lochner?, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 129.
150. Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318,
322 (2018).
151. See infra Part III.
152. See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s
dissent in Sorrell).
153. See infra notes 307–327 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s
dissent in Becerra).
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freedom of speech as “a malleable concept.”154 He perceives the First
Amendment as “an elastic amendment, expanding and contracting
depending on the interests that each side asserted for the dispute
currently before the Court. Through proportionality testing, Breyer
typically will determine if, in his estimation, the government’s ends
justify the means employed to achieve these goals.”155
More precisely, as Breyer defined it in a Second Amendment
156
case, the bottom-line question is “whether the statute imposes
burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate
objectives, are disproportionate.”157 He explained in his book Making
Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View that “[p]roportionality
involves balancing.”158 He added that it “is specially designed for a
context where important constitutional rights and interests conflict”
and “useful when a statute restricts one constitutionally protected
interest in order to further some other comparably important
interest.”159 For example, in a 2001 case pitting free speech interests
against privacy concerns, Breyer described his proportionality of
harms-benefits balancing approach as:
[A]sk[ing] whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead
impose restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when measured
against their corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into
account the kind, the importance, and the extent of these benefits, as well as
the need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits?160

154. Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G.
Breyer’s Fluid Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 507 (2016).
155. Id.
156. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second
Amendment has been incorporated by the Supreme Court to apply to state and local
government entities and officials through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding “that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second
Amendment right” as recognized by the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008)).
157. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 693 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
158. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW
164 (2010).
159. Id. at 163-65.
160. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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Proportionality is popular in other legal systems, including those
of European nations,161 but not in U.S. Constitutional law162 or in First
Amendment jurisprudence163—unless the justice in question is named
Breyer.164 Or as veteran First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams
recently put it, Breyer “has offered interpretations of the First
Amendment that appear to me to be closer to those adopted in
European nations in interpreting their more limited free speech
protections under the European Convention on Human Rights.”165
Breyer disdains a rigid categorical approach to First Amendment
jurisprudence in which content-based laws typically are subject to
strict scrutiny review while content-neutral laws face intermediate
scrutiny.166 For example, Breyer wrote in his 2015 concurrence in Reed
v. Town of Gilbert that:
161. See Mark S. Kende, The Unmasking of Balancing and Proportionality
Review in U.S. Constitutional Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 417, 424 (2017)
(noting that “proportionality review took the world by storm after World War II with
many nations having a key case, except the U.S.”).
162. Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial
Review, Factfinding, and Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2361 (2017)
(“[P]roportionality doctrine is not viewed as a general measure of rights violations in
the United States, nor is proportionality treated as a general principle of U.S.
constitutional law.”).
163. As Harvard Professor Vicki Jackson summarizes it,
“Proportionality” is today accepted as a general principle of law by
constitutional courts and international tribunals around the world.
“Proportionality review,” a structured form of doctrine, now flows across
national lines, a seemingly common methodology for evaluating many
constitutional and human rights claims. The United States is often viewed
as an outlier in this transnational embrace of proportionality in
constitutional law.
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3096 (2015).
164. See Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies, Judges as Diplomats in Advancing
the Rule of Law: A Conversation With President Koen Lenaerts and Justice Stephen
Breyer, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2017) (noting that “Justice Breyer has restated
the case for the judge . . . to learn from foreign legal ideas, particularly the European
constitutional concept of proportionality when adjudicating on the First
Amendment”).
165. Floyd Abrams, Keynote Remarks, Free Speech Under Fire: The Future
of the First Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 58 (2016).
166. As Professor Dan Kozlowski tidily encapsulates it,
The approach to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by the
Supreme Court of the United States depends heavily on categorical analysis.
In its jurisprudence, the Court has recognized three categories of regulations
on expression: content neutral, content based, and viewpoint based.
Whether a regulation will be upheld depends in large measure on the
Court’s initial determination of the category to which it belongs. The Court
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The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the
Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for
regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as “content
discrimination” and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my view, the
category “content discrimination” is better considered in many contexts,
including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic “strict
scrutiny” trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.167

The same year Reed was decided, Breyer penned a two-sentence
concurrence in the free speech case of Williams-Yulee v. Florida
Bar.168 Breyer’s opinion was devoted solely to reiterating his view that
“this Court’s doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny [are] guidelines
informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be
mechanically applied.”169 In a nutshell, as Professor Lillian R. BeVier
observes, “Justice Breyer has unambiguously announced his intention
to reshape First Amendment doctrine.”170
Breyer responds to the concern that proportionality gives judges
too much discretion by pointing out that “a judge who uses such an
approach must examine and explain all the factors that go into a
decision. The need for that examination and explanation serves as a
constraint. It means the decision must be transparent and subject to
criticism.”171
Beyond bridling against a tiers-of-scrutiny approach,172 Breyer
focuses on the First Amendment’s “expressive objectives” in the
quotation above from Reed.173 He foreshadows his remarks in Becerra
noted above about potentially reserving heightened scrutiny for cases
in which certain “First Amendment goals” and “the true value of
has devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral regulations
(strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient intermediate
scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral), but it has said that
viewpoint-based regulations are unconstitutional.
Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget
Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131-32 (2008).
167. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
168. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
169. Id.
170. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice
Breyer be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1283 (2005).
171. BREYER, supra note 158, at 170.
172. Cf. Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for a
Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate
the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV . 2019, 2031 (2015) (noting that in Reed,
“Breyer rejected a one-size-fits-all approach to First Amendment jurisprudence”).
173. Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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protecting freedom of speech” are at stake.174 In Making Our
Democracy Work: A Judge’s View, Breyer elaborates that “[v]alues
are the constitutional analogue of statutory purposes.”175
Constitutional values, for Breyer, are neither fleeting nor ephemeral.176
Instead, they are “deep, enduring,” and “change little over time.”177
When it comes to free speech, he offers one example: “[T]he
expressive values underlying the First Amendment’s speech
protection tell us that the amendment strongly protects political speech
over the Internet while offering little if any protection to Internet fraud
schemes.”178 In other words, traditional values—protecting political
speech, to use Breyer’s example—can be applied to modern
technologies, such as the Internet.
The bottom line is that Breyer is engaged in what Professor Mark
Tushnet calls a project of the “partial de-doctrinalization of the First
Amendment.”179 To wit, Professors Vikram David Amar and Alan
Brownstein contend that Breyer’s concurrence in the Stolen Valor Act
case of United States v. Alvarez “was written as if there were no formal
free speech doctrine currently in use that constrains judges’
assessments of free speech claims.”180 Breyer’s willingness to break
free from—or at least to loosen up—the chains of First Amendment
doctrine thus facilitates today’s confusion about when a law affecting
speech merits heightened scrutiny and when it is tested by rational
basis review. Thus, it is not surprising that he wrote both the dissent
in Sorrell181 and, as discussed in the next Part of this Article, the dissent
in Becerra.182 And all of this doctrinal blurriness is compounded by
the Court’s penchant under Chief Justice Roberts’s leadership for
avoidance and minimalism which, “along with political partisanship,
174. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 238283 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. BREYER, supra note 158, at 162.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
179. Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of
Free Speech Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014).
180. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First
Amendment: Alvarez and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 491, 497 (2013). Along the lines of proportionality, Breyer reasoned in Alvarez
that the Stolen Valor Act “works disproportionate constitutional harm.” United States
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 739 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
181. See supra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (addressing Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell).
182. See infra notes 307-327 and accompanying text (addressing Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Becerra).
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have detrimentally affected multiple First Amendment doctrines
during the past five years.”183
With this background in mind, the Article next turns to three
Supreme Court decisions—one from 2017 and two from 2018.184 They
reveal, in one manner or another, the division on the Court between
when and whether heightened First Amendment scrutiny is warranted
for cases affecting speech.
III. TODAY’S DIVIDE ON SPEECH AND SCRUTINY: A TRIO OF KEY
DECISIONS
This Part has three Sections, each of which separately examines
facets of one of three recent Supreme Court rulings that reveal possible
reasons for the current fracturing among the justices on standards of
scrutiny in cases impacting free expression. The cases are, in the order
addressed below and dating from the oldest to most recent decision,
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,185 National Institute of
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra186 and Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.187 Rather than
analyzing all issues and aspects of this trio of cases, this Part
concentrates on the justices’ battle over the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny and how much deference is due from the Court to the
legislative body in scrutinizing the statutes at issue.
A. Expressions Hair Design
In March 2017, the Supreme Court in Expressions Hair Design
v. Schneiderman held that a New York statute banning merchants in
the Empire State from imposing surcharges on customers who pay
with a credit card rather than cash raised First Amendment-based

183. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal
Drifts: Paying the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of
Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 943, 990
(2016). A complete discussion of avoidance and minimalism is beyond the scope of
this Article.
184. See infra Part III.
185. See generally Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144
(2017).
186. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018).
187. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S.
Ct. 2448 (2018).
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speech issues.188 In doing so, the Court reversed the opinion of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had held that the
statute merely regulated economic conduct, not speech.189
Expressions Hair Design thus is important for purposes of this
Article because it exposes the tension among the justices in separating
speech cases from conduct cases and, in turn, separating statutes
meriting heightened review from those deserving rational basis
review. Subsection 1 concentrates on facets of the majority opinion in
Expressions Hair Design that illustrate this strain, while Subsection 2
focuses on Justice Stephen Breyer’s solo concurrence.
1. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the Court’s opinion and was
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan.190
Although this clustering of justices bridged conservatives and liberals,
Roberts’s opinion nonetheless is important here because it
demonstrates how the Court had to grapple with determining whether
a statute involved speech or merely conduct.
Underlying the law at issue in Expressions Hair Design are the
transaction fees—commonly known as swipe fees—that credit card
companies charge merchants each time customers use a credit card to
pay for a good or service.191 How do merchants deal with these fees if
they want to recoup them? They have three options.192 Specifically,
188. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2017) (providing, in pertinent
part, that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means”);
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017) (concluding
that the New York anti-surcharge statute “does regulate speech” and remanding case
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second to determine the statute’s constitutionality).
189. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 130 (2d
Cir. 2015) (concluding that the statute “does not regulate speech as applied to singlesticker-price sellers”), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
190. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1146. Justice Sotomayor authored
a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Alito. See id. at 1153 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). A discussion of Sotomayor’s opinion, which focused on certification of
the statutory question, is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally id. at 115359.
191. Clay Calvert et al., Speech v. Conduct, Surcharges v. Discounts: Testing
the Limits of the First Amendment and Statutory Construction in the Growing Credit
Card Quagmire, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 157 (2017) (“When
merchants accept a customer’s credit card, they are contractually obligated to pay a
percentage of the transaction total—a swipe fee—to the credit card company (e.g.,
Visa, MasterCard, or American Express).”).
192. See id.
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they “can raise sticker prices to make up the difference; pass on some
or all of the swipe fee directly to their customers via a surcharge for
credit card purchases; or offer an incentive, such as a discount, to
encourage customers to pay with cash.”193
The New York statute at issue in Expressions Hair Design,
however, banned that second option.194 Specifically, it provided: “[n]o
seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar
means.”195 By its terms, the statute appears to regulate only a
commercial transaction, and it leaves merchants free to give discounts
to customers who choose to pay with cash.196 How, then, does a
possible First Amendment issue come into play? It does so when
merchants attempt to communicate with or talk to customers about the
difference between prices being charged.197 As Professor Mark
Chenoweth explains:
The problem arises when a merchant wishes to characterize the price
difference as a “surcharge” for credit. Whether such a merchant wishes to
explain why it charges more to its customers using credit cards, to deter
credit purchases, or simply to be free from government dictates, the
dilemma remains the same: Is this dispute about speech or merely conduct,
and, if the former, does the First Amendment protect the merchant’s
speech?198

More specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the
statute raised a First Amendment-based speech issue as applied to a
particular “single-sticker pricing” scenario—one in which a merchant
posts a price on a product and then notes that a surcharge, either in the
form of a percentage or a specific amount more than the sticker price,
will be imposed for customers using a credit card.199 This is distinct

193. Id.
194. See generally N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2017).
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151 (“What the law does
regulate is how sellers may communicate their prices.”).
198. Mark Chenoweth, Expressions Hair Design: Detangling the
Commercial-Free-Speech Knot, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227, 227-28.
199. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1148; see also id. at 1149
(“Although the merchants have presented a wide array of hypothetical pricing
regimes, they have expressly identified only one pricing scheme that they seek to
employ: posting a cash price and an additional credit card surcharge, expressed either
as a percentage surcharge or a ‘dollars-and-cents’ additional amount.”).
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from a merchant posting two separate prices—one for cash, one for
credit.200
The Supreme Court agreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit’s determination that the New York statute banned
the single-sticker pricing scenario described immediately above.201
The Supreme Court, however, soon parted ways after that with the
Second Circuit on whether this ban, in fact, affected the speech of
merchants. The Second Circuit had found that the statute “posed no
First Amendment problem because . . . [it] regulate[d] conduct, not
speech.”202 Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that the sticker
price must be the same as or equal to the price a customer would pay
using a credit card and that this was “simply a conduct regulation.”203
Chief Justice Roberts and the majority, weighing into the
question of whether the First Amendment was implicated, disagreed.
In doing so, they delved into—just as the majority had in Sorrell204—
whether any burden imposed on the speech of merchants was
“incidental” to the statute’s “primary effect on conduct.”205 Roberts
explained that the burden would be incidental if all that the statute did
was “regulate the amount that a store could collect” for selling a
particular item, such as specifying that “all New York delis to charge
$10 for their sandwiches.”206
This, the majority concluded, was not the case with New York’s
anti-charge law because merchants were freely allowed to sell any
item at any price.207 Instead, the majority found that the statute:
[Impacted] how sellers may communicate their prices. A merchant who
wants to charge $10 for cash and $10.30 for credit may not convey that price
any way he pleases. He is not free to say “$10, with a 3% credit card
surcharge” or “$10, plus $0.30 for credit” because both of those displays

200. See id. at 1149. A two-price scenario would involve a merchant posting
“separate dollars-and-cents prices for cash and credit” such as “$10 cash, $10.30
credit.” Id. at 1149, n.1.
201. See id. at 1149-50.
202. Id. at 1150.
203. Id.
204. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567, 570 (2011); supra
notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing Sorrell’s consideration of whether
the statute in that case imposed an incidental burden on speech or something more).
205. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1151.
206. Id. at 1150.
207. Id. at 1151 (“The law tells merchants nothing about the amount they are
allowed to collect from a cash or credit card payer. Sellers are free to charge $10 for
cash and $9.70, $10, $10.30, or any other amount for credit.”).
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identify a single sticker price—$10—that is less than the amount credit card
users will be charged.208

While the majority thus found that speech was at issue, it did
little else beyond remanding the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit to evaluate Expressions Hair Design as a speech
case.209 It did not, for instance, decide what level of scrutiny should
apply on remand.210 Furthermore, as Professor Amanda Shanor points
out, “the Court declined to articulate broader rules about how courts
should identify ‘speech’ for constitutional purposes.”211
2. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
While the Supreme Court’s ruling came without dissent, Justice
Breyer issued a brief but important concurring opinion openly
questioning the importance of separating speech from conduct and
reiterating portions of his assertions in Sorrell.212 As Breyer put it, “it
is often wiser not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and
‘conduct’” “because virtually all government regulation affects
speech.”213 More colloquially, Breyer was willing to stipulate that
speech was involved in Expressions Hair Design because almost all
interactions between humans involve speech at some level.214 Thus,
rather than focusing on whether speech is involved, the better
approach, Breyer contended, is to ask whether the law at issue “affects
an interest that the First Amendment protects.”215
What does this mean? Breyer explained that if a law “negatively
affects the processes through which political discourse or public
opinion is formed or expressed (interests close to the First
Amendment’s protective core), courts normally scrutinize that
regulation with great care.”216 In this statement, he avoids using the
term “strict scrutiny” that typically applies in political speech cases,217
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Shanor, supra note 150, at 333.
212. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Id. (“Human relations take place through speech.”).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in 2010, “political speech must
prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws
that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is
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thereby dodging any possible embracement of a traditional doctrinal
standard and leaving one to wonder if “great care” is synonymous with
strict scrutiny or if it means something else.
Importantly, and as noted in the Introduction218 and as discussed
later in Becerra,219 this approach also tracks Breyer’s efforts to limit
the application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny—
specifically, what one typically calls strict scrutiny—to cases only in
which the regulated speech directly serves certain values, such as
facilitating “the processes through which political discourse or public
opinion is formed or expressed.”220 In other words, Breyer intimates
that the benchmark for determining when strict scrutiny applies is not
to see if the law in question is content based, but instead to determine
if the law affects some important value residing at “the First
Amendment’s protective core.”221 This values-based approach later
blossoms in Becerra in 2018. There, Breyer suggests that heightened
scrutiny should come into play only when the “true value of protecting
freedom of speech” is at stake, such as safeguarding unpopular views
and facilitating the truth-seeking function of speech in the marketplace
of ideas but not when speech is impacted by “economic and social
laws that legislatures long would have thought themselves free to
enact.”222
Next, Breyer added that “[i]f the challenged regulation restricts
the ‘informational function’ provided by truthful commercial speech,
courts will apply a ‘lesser’ (but still elevated) form of scrutiny.”223 Just
as he stopped short of using the term “strict scrutiny” when it came to
speech affecting political discourse, here too Breyer avoided using the
term “intermediate scrutiny”—the traditional doctrinal classification
for speech regulated under the commercial speech doctrine.224
Breyer then wrote that “a more permissive standard of review”
applies when the government compels commercial speakers to
disclose factual and uncontroversial information because such
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
218. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 312, 316 and accompanying text.
220. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
221. Id.
222. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 238283 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
224. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (addressing the commercial
speech doctrine).
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regulations
have
“only
a
‘minimal’
effect
on First
225
Amendment interests.” This permissive standard, he added, is one
of reasonableness.226 Finally, Breyer opined that “a similarly
permissive standard of review” of rational basis review applies to laws
targeting “ordinary commercial transactions” because such
“legislation normally does not significantly affect the interests that the
First Amendment protects.”227
Citing his own dissent in Sorrell for support, Breyer resolved
that determining which one of the above standards was “the proper
approach is typically more important than trying to distinguish
‘speech’ from ‘conduct.’”228 Expressions Hair Design afforded Breyer
the opportunity to make this point because it was “not clear just what
New York’s law [did].”229 He ultimately passed on choosing what
standard should apply, however, because the statute’s interpretation
was properly “a matter of state law.”230
Ultimately, Breyer’s approach to resolving the appropriate level
of scrutiny concentrates “on the communicative interest at stake, on a
sliding scale of the speech’s importance, with political speech
receiving high protections and speech in ‘ordinary’ business
transactions very little.”231 Just as Sorrell did, Expressions Hair
Design afforded Breyer the chance to voice “his view that the
Supreme Court has entered dangerous territory in subjecting laws
regulating economic matters to heightened First Amendment
scrutiny.”232
For Breyer, then, the key question is not whether speech is
involved in any given case because speech almost inevitably is
involved.233 Therefore, exerting time and effort sorting out speech
225. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
226. Id.
227. Id. (quoting United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938)).
228. Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
229. Id. at 1153.
230. Id.
231. Matthew Moloshok, Fuzzy Rules, Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, and Ohio v. American Express, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb.
2018, at 1-3.
232. Adam Liptak, Justices Side with Free-Speech Challenge to Credit Card
Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/
supreme-court-credit-card-fees.html [https://perma.cc/WKY2-4LWZ].
233. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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from conduct is a waste of judicial time.234 The weightier issue,
instead, is determining what value the speech serves, as measured
against a hierarchy of First Amendment reasons for protecting speech
from government control.235 If, in other words, one determines that
safeguarding the speech at issue would serve or facilitate a core First
Amendment value, then either a more rigorous standard of scrutiny or
a more searching analysis should apply to better protect it against
unnecessary government control or censorship.236
And by not affixing labels like strict scrutiny or intermediate
scrutiny in Expressions Hair Design to the top two levels of review,
Breyer intimates a more fluid approach akin to proportionality.237 It is
a tack under which the focus is not so much on whether the
government has a compelling238 or a significant239 interest in regulating
the speech or whether the law regulating is content based240 or content
neutral241 but instead on whether the speech being regulated serves a
sufficiently high value on the First Amendment totem to warrant a law
undergoing a more rigorous review.242 The starting point of analysis
thus is not necessarily whether a law serves a particular government

234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II
(addressing proportionality as conceptualized by Justice Breyer).
238. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)
(explaining a statute must be “justified by a compelling government interest” under
strict scrutiny).
239. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017)
(explaining that under intermediate scrutiny the government typically must prove that
it has a significant interest).
240. Under traditional principles of First Amendment law, “[c]ontent-based
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
395 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991)).
241. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (observing that
the government is afforded “somewhat wider leeway to regulate features of speech
unrelated to its content,” and explaining that the government must prove that a
content-neutral regulation of speech is narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest
and that the regulation leaves open ample alternative means for communicating the
information in question).
242. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152
(2017) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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interest but whether the speech serves a particular First Amendment
value.243
B. Becerra
In June 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court in Becerra held that two
parts of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability,
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) codified in
the state’s Health and Safety Code likely violated the First
Amendment.244 One part245 applied to licensed crisis pregnancy
centers.246 The other247 affected unlicensed crisis pregnancy centers.248
Both facets, however, mandated the communication of government
messages.249
The centers to which these provisions applied advocated against
abortion250 and were “often affiliated with religious groups.”251 More

243. See id.
244. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378
(2018) (“We hold that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim
that the FACT Act violates the First Amendment.”); see Cal. Health & Safety Code §
123472 (2016) (providing the two aspects of the FACT Act at issue and struck down
by the Supreme Court in Becerra).
245. See § 123472(a).
246. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123471(a) (2016) (providing the criteria
for defining a licensed center).
247. § 123472(b) (2016).
248. See id. (providing the criteria for defining an unlicensed center).
249. See §§ 123471(a)-(b).
250. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Takes Case on Free Speech Rights of
Antiabortion Counseling Centers, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-case-onfree-speech-rights-of-antiabortion-counseling-centers/2017/11/13/cd2003f8-c88211e7-aa96-54417592cf72_story.html?utm_term=.7c1e267f7d15
[https://perma.cc/YU6W-3ESQ] (reporting that crisis pregnancy centers “counsel
against abortion” and “provide services for pregnant women and try to persuade them
not to end their pregnancies”); Adam Liptak, Justices Take Cases on Free Speech at
Pregnancy Centers and Polling Places, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/us/politics/supreme-court-first-amendmentpregnancy-voting.html [https:/perma.cc/8N2X-EJFA] (“The centers seek to persuade
women to choose parenting or adoption.”).
251. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Warily Eyes California Law Involving
Abortion and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/20/us/politics/supreme-court-abortion-free-speech-crisis-pregnancycenters.html [https://perma.cc/J5GK-V9UK].
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provocatively parsed by one critic, the centers “spew[ed]
misinformation, if not downright lies.”252
Under California law, licensed crisis pregnancy centers must
disseminate to clients on their premises the following message:
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or lowcost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all
FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion
for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”253
Unlicensed centers are compelled to post a message on their premises
explaining they are not licensed as medical facilities by California and
do not have licensed medical providers.254 Additionally, unlicensed
facilities are required to publish that same information “in any print
and digital advertising materials including Internet Web sites” in both
English and other languages.255
As framed by Justice Clarence Thomas in the majority opinion,
the issue was whether the “notice requirements violate[d] the First
Amendment.”256 The centers objected to the law primarily because, as
the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) asserted,
California’s “compelled speech requirement drown[ed] out the
centers’ pro-life messages.”257 NIFLA also complained because
“California impose[d] this compelled speech only on centers that
oppose[d] abortion.”258 Put more emphatically in a later NIFLA brief,
the organization argued that “California forces pro-life licensed
centers to point the way to free or low-cost abortions, making those
centers complicit in facilitating an act they believe hurts women and
destroys innocent lives.”259
252. Robin Abcarian, The Supreme Court Puts Religion-Based Dishonesty
Above the Health and Welfare of Vulnerable Pregnant Women, L.A. TIMES (June 29,
2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-abcarian-abortion-scotus20180629-story.html [https://perma.cc/98VC-VX99].
253. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123472(a)(1) (2016).
254. § 123472(b)(1) (“The notice shall state: ‘This facility is not licensed as a
medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical provider who
provides or directly supervises the provision of services.’”).
255. § 123472(b). The specific other languages were based upon “the primary
threshold languages for Medi-Cal beneficiaries as determined by the State Department
of Health Care Services for the county in which the facility is located.” § 123472(a).
256. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2368 (2018).
257. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 161140).
258. See id. at 2.
259. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 236 (No. 16-1140).
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In short, NIFLA asserted that both requirements violated the
unenumerated First Amendment right not to speak.260 That right was
established more than seventy-five years ago in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.261 The Court held there that publicschool students could not be compelled either to pledge allegiance to
the United States or to engage in the symbolic expression of saluting
the American flag.262
This implied First Amendment right was later developed in cases
such as Wooley v. Maynard,263 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo264 and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group.265 However, the parameters of the right not to speak remain
ambiguous. As Professor Nat Stern asserts, “the right to resist

260. Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer
“Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 432 (2016) (“The right to speak and the right
not to speak are ‘complementary.’”); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
257, at 15-17.
261. See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (establishing the right not to speak).
262. Id. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). The Court explained in Barnette:
“There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of
utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The
use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality,
is a short cut from mind to mind.” Id. at 632.
263. See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (describing
further the right not to speak). In Wooley, the Court held that a state cannot force
individuals to display a motto on government-required license plates that “is
repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.” Id. at 707.
264. See generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(providing further clarification on the right not to speak). In Tornillo, the Court struck
down a Florida right-of-reply statute that compelled newspapers in the Sunshine State
to give free space in their pages to political candidates who had either their personal
character or official record assailed by those newspapers. See id. at 243-44. The Court
reasoned that “[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment.” Id. at 258.
265. See generally Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (discussing the “right to speak” in a contemporary context). In
Hurley, the Court held that private citizens who organize a parade cannot be
compelled by the government to include in that parade “a group imparting a message
the organizers do not wish to convey.” Id. at 559.
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governmentally imposed expressive activities has evolved into a
sprawling and ungainly doctrine.”266
In Becerra, and regarding the notice requirement at licensed
facilities, NIFLA argued that:
California now forces licensed centers to communicate the government’s
message about state-funded abortions to everyone who walks in the door.
The State, rather than using countless alternative ways to communicate its
message, including its own powerful voice, instead compels only licensed
facilities that help women consider alternatives to abortion to express the
government’s message regarding how to obtain abortions paid for by the
State.267

As for the requirement that unlicensed centers include
disclaimers in all advertisements and in different languages that they
are not licensed medical facilities, NIFLA averred that the mandate
“ma[de] ads so long that it [was] difficult, if not impossible, for
unlicensed centers to advocate their own pro-life message in most
media, like bus or newspaper ads.”268 NIFLA also contended that the
“disclaimers force[d] the unlicensed centers to begin their expressive
relationship with an immediate unwanted or negative message that
crowd[ed] out and confuse[d] their intended message. The
law effectively suppresse[d] their speech based on its viewpoint
opposing abortion.”269
California and its attorney general, Xavier Becerra, countered
that the compelled speech obligation at licensed centers educated
women about the availability of free or low-cost abortion services.270
This, in turn, would allow them to make informed choices concerning
their pregnancy options.271 As California’s initial brief to the Court put
it:
[The notice requirement] ensures that low-income women who are or may
be pregnant have the information they need in order to seek, if they wish,
the time-sensitive comprehensive medical care that is available through

266. See Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59
BUFF. L. REV. 847, 849 (2011).
267. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 16.
268. Id. at 16-17.
269. Id. at 17.
270. See Brief for State Respondents at 5-6, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16–1140).
271. See id. (asserting that “each year thousands of women are unaware
of relevant public health programs when they learn that they are pregnant,” and adding
that “[a] woman’s ability to learn about and obtain needed medical services in such
circumstances may be especially limited if she is low-income”).
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public programs. The statute is designed to reach an audience in need of
such information at a critical moment.272

In terms of requiring disclaimers in ads for (and on the premises
of) unlicensed clinics that they had no license to provide medical
services, California argued that women should be able to know what
kind of services a center does or does not offer.273 Additionally,
California contended that “[t]he First Amendment does not bar States
from advancing that interest by requiring service providers to disclose
a neutral statement of fact regarding the existence or not of a
governmental license.”274
The big-picture issue facing the Supreme Court was whether the
compelled speech obligations imposed on both licensed and
unlicensed facilities violated the First Amendment right not to
speak.275 Yet, the critical underlying issue—the one of particular
importance for this Article—was the level of scrutiny against which
the FACT Act’s provisions should be measured. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2016 upheld both parts in a unanimous
three-judge decision.276 It concluded that intermediate scrutiny
supplied the appropriate test for the provision affecting licensed
clinics.277 It reasoned that intermediate scrutiny applied to the notice
requirement at licensed centers because the statute affected so-called
professional speech.278 This, as the Ninth Circuit defined it, is “speech
that occurs between professionals and their clients in the context of
their professional relationship.”279 In Becerra, the court specified that
“the Licensed Notice regulates the clinics’ speech in the context of
medical treatment, counseling, or advertising.”280 The Ninth Circuit
272. Id. at 15.
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368
(2018) (“The question in this case is whether these notice requirements violate the
First Amendment.”).
276. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 845
(9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138
S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
277. Id. at 829 (“For the free speech claim, we conclude that the proper level
of scrutiny to apply to the Act’s regulation of licensed clinics is intermediate scrutiny,
which it survives.”).
278. Id. at 840 (“Because licensed clinics offer medical and clinical services
in a professional context, the speech within their walls related to their professional
services is professional speech.”).
279. Id. at 839.
280. Id. at 840.
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found that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because the speech
affected by the law was not part of a larger “public dialogue.”281
In terms of the required notice provision affecting unlicensed
clinics, the Ninth Circuit did not resolve what level of scrutiny was
appropriate.282 Instead, it held that the provision would pass
constitutional muster even under the most rigorous level of review,
strict scrutiny.283
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling on both provisions.284 It held that “petitioners [were] likely to
succeed on the merits of their claim that the FACT Act violates the
First Amendment.”285 Yet in doing so, the justices divided five to
four—along perceived conservative and liberal lines—on the
applicable level of scrutiny and, importantly, on how that level of
scrutiny should be determined.286
This Article concentrates on the battle over scrutiny regarding
the licensed-centers mandate. Why? First, that fight provides a clear
window into the contrasting approaches for determining scrutiny,
thereby rendering analysis of the unlicensed-centers requirement
unnecessary for this Article’s focus, which is on the conflicting
approaches for determining when heightened scrutiny is warranted.
Second, and more importantly, the Becerra majority punted on the
level of scrutiny question as applied to the unlicensed-centers
provision.287 It simply held that California’s mandate for those
facilities could not survive even under a deferential rational basis
approach.288
When it came to the compelled-notice requirement for licensed
centers, the five-justice majority, in an opinion authored by Justice
Thomas:

281. Id.
282. Id. at 844 n.10 (“To be clear, we do not conclude that strict scrutiny is the
correct level of scrutiny to apply to the Unlicensed Notice. We only conclude that it
can survive strict scrutiny.”).
283. See id. at 843.
284. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2378 (2018).
285. Id.
286. See id. at 2361-62.
287. See id. at 2376-77.
288. Id. (“The parties dispute whether the unlicensed notice is subject to
deferential review under Zauderer. We need not decide whether the Zauderer standard
applies to the unlicensed notice.”).
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1) Held that the provision “regulate[d] speech as speech,” was
“a content-based regulation” and therefore was
presumptively unconstitutional and typically would be
subject to a “stringent standard” of review tantamount to
strict scrutiny;289
2) Found it unnecessary, however, to apply strict scrutiny
because the notice requirement could not “survive even
intermediate scrutiny;”290
3) Reasoned that the requirement could not surmount
intermediate scrutiny because, even assuming that California
had a substantial interest in educating low-income women
about the availability of free or low-cost abortion services,
the requirement was “not sufficiently drawn to achieve it”
due to its underinclusiveness;291
4) Rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the requirement
should be treated as a regulation of “professional speech” and
thereby afforded more deferential review;292
5) Rebuffed the argument that the requirement should be
reviewed under the “lower level of scrutiny” established in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which involved
a rule compelling attorneys to disclose “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” about contingency fee
arrangements in their advertisements;293 and lastly

289. Id. at 2371, 2374.
290. Id. at 2375.
291. Id. at 2375-76. See generally Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First
Amendment: The Legislative Right to Nibble at Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 525, 525 (2016) (providing an overview of the underinclusiveness
doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence).
292. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371-72. The majority added that “neither
California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for treating
professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First
Amendment principles.” Id. at 2375.
293. Id. at 2375; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
637, 651 (1985). The Court in Zauderer held that “that an advertiser’s rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Id. at 651. In adopting this
relaxed standard of review, the Court explained that “the First Amendment interests
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake
when speech is actually suppressed.” Id. at 651 n.14. The majority in Becerra bluntly
rejected Zauderer’s applicability, writing that “[t]he Zauderer standard does not apply
here.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
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6) Rejected the notion that the requirement was simply a
regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally
affected speech.294
In summary, the majority applied a heightened level of inquiry—
intermediate scrutiny—greater than rational basis review to strike
down the notice requirement for licensed centers.295 In reaching that
result, the majority’s analysis focused heavily on whether the
provision was content based (yes, it concluded) and whether, in turn,
any exception—be it a professional speech exception, a professional
conduct exception, or Zauderer’s compelled-disclosure exception—
applied to exempt the provision from analysis under strict scrutiny that
typically applies to content-based laws (no, it concluded).296
The majority tossed California (and, by extension, the liberal
justices) a tiny legal bone by not shutting the door on the possibility
that a persuasive reason may, under some scenario, exist “for treating
professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from
ordinary First Amendment principles.”297 One of those ordinary
principles, of course, is that whether a law is content based or content
neutral is key for determining the level of scrutiny.298 Another is that
content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional and typically
subject to a “stringent standard” of review akin to strict scrutiny.299
The majority, however, quickly yanked that bone away. It held
not only that California failed to prove such a reason in Becerra, but
that even if it had done so, it would not have mattered because the

294. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (“The licensed notice at issue here is not an
informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.”).
295. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (explaining when rational
basis review typically applies).
296. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371-72.
297. Id. at 2375.
298. Id. at 2371 (“The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech. When
enforcing this prohibition, our precedents distinguish between content-based and
content-neutral regulations of speech.”).
299. Id. Justice Thomas’s description in Becerra of this stringent standard as
requiring a “compelling” government interest and a narrowly tailored statute to serve
it was drawn from his own description of strict scrutiny in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226-27 (2015). Id. In Reed, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that
“[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward
the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
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compelled-notice requirement for licensed centers failed the more
permissive, yet still heightened, intermediate scrutiny test.300
Finally, it is important to note how Justice Thomas used Sorrell
in Becerra.301 Specifically, he cited it to support the proposition that
content-based regulations of speech affecting the fields of health and
medicine are dangerous and thus should be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.302 Additionally, Thomas deployed Sorrell to seemingly rebut
the notion espoused by Justice Breyer in Expressions Hair Design303
and in his Becerra dissent304 that drawing a line between speech and
conduct was no longer important.305 Finally, the majority cited Sorrell
to support the idea that laws that distinguish between speakers merit
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.306 In a nutshell, then, Sorrell
became a vehicle for turning Becerra into a full-blown First
Amendment case demanding heightened scrutiny.
Justice Breyer, joined in dissent by fellow liberal Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, held that both provisions of the
FACT Act were “likely constitutional.”307 In doing so, Breyer:
1) Blasted the majority’s approach for determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny, claiming it “threatens to create
serious problems;”308
2) Objected to the majority’s application of what Breyer called
“heightened scrutiny” to the mandate affecting licensed
centers simply because the FACT Act was a content-based
restriction of speech, with Breyer emphasizing that
“[v]irtually every disclosure law could be considered
‘content based;’”309

300. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
301. See id. at 2374.
302. See id.
303. See supra notes 21-24, 228 and accompanying text (describing Breyer’s
views in Expressions Hair Design on the relationship between speech and conduct).
304. See infra note 346 and accompanying text (describing Breyer’s views in
Becerra on the relationship between speech and conduct).
305. See generally Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 553 (2011) (explaining that while drawing the line between speech and
conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long drawn it).
306. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367.
307. See id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 2380.
309. Id.
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3) Spelled out a virtual parade of horribles, just as he had done
in dissent in Sorrell,310 regarding “the constitutional validity
of much, perhaps most, government regulation” involving
compelled disclosures;311 and
4) Rebuked the majority both for “suggesting that heightened
scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation”
and for causing “serious disservice” to traditional First
Amendment goals, such as discovering truth in the
marketplace of ideas and protecting unpopular ideas, by
invoking them in the name of applying heightened scrutiny
in Becerra.312
Just as he did in dissent in Sorrell,313 Breyer raised the possibility
that the majority’s nondeferential approach in Becerra represented a
return to the Lochner era.314 For the dissent, applying heightened
scrutiny in Becerra contradicts the traditional deference and
“respectful approach” due to legislative bodies when regulating
“ordinary economic and social legislation” and the medical
profession.315 Ramping up First Amendment scrutiny when it is
unnecessary to do so ultimately causes long-term harm by clouding
what Breyer called “the true value of protecting freedom of speech.”316
In other words, and as suggested earlier, Breyer and the dissent
intimated that a values-based approach—rather than a content-basedversus-content-neutral methodology—provides the better technique
for deciding when heightened scrutiny applies in a case involving
speech.317 Only when a value residing at the core of the First
Amendment is jeopardized is heightened scrutiny warranted. In other
words, as Justice Kagan wrote for the same bloc of four justices in
310. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
311. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that “the
majority’s view, if taken literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps placing
much securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk”).
312. Id. at 2382-83.
313. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
314. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that
“[e]ven during the Lochner era, when this Court struck down numerous economic
regulations concerning industry, this Court was careful to defer to state legislative
judgments concerning the medical profession,” and adding that “[i]n the name of
the First Amendment, the majority today treads into territory where the pre-New Deal,
as well as the post-New Deal, Court refused to go”).
315. Id. at 2381-82.
316. Id. at 2383.
317. See id. at 2382-83 (addressing this values-based approach to scrutiny).
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dissent in Janus just one day after Becerra, “[t]he First Amendment
was meant for better things” than being used as a scalpel to cut and
carve away at “workaday economic and regulatory policy.”318 More
bluntly stated, there is a certain amount of constitutional
disingenuousness involved that degrades the real reasons for having a
First Amendment Free Speech Clause when any content-based law
affecting speech triggers heightened scrutiny, be it strict or
intermediate.
Breyer explained why the “majority’s general broad ‘contentbased’ test” for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny is
misguided when it comes to disclosure laws.319 He wrote that this “test
invites courts around the Nation to apply an unpredictable First
Amendment to ordinary social and economic regulation, striking
down disclosure laws that judges may disfavor, while upholding
others, all without grounding their decisions in reasoned principle.”320
A reasoned principle, Breyer suggested, for applying a rigorous level
of review to disclosure laws would be if they were viewpoint based.321
For the dissent, the level of scrutiny that should have been
applied to the compelled-disclosure requirements for licensed crisis
pregnancy centers was the version of rational basis review articulated
by the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.322 Under
that test, compelled disclosure of information is permissible under the
First Amendment if the government’s reason for compelling speech is
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception.”323
This test amounts to rational basis review.324 Breyer thus wrote that
318. Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501-02
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
319. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. Id.
321. Id. (“Notably, the majority says nothing about limiting its language to the
kind of instance where the Court has traditionally found the First Amendment wary
of content-based laws, namely, in cases of viewpoint discrimination.”).
322. See id. at 2386-87; see generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
323. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
324. Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 521 (2014)
(emphasis added) (“Zauderer has led to considerable confusion in the lower courts
about what sorts of commercial speech disclosure requirements are covered by its
rational basis standard of review.”); Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate
Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 505 (2018) (“Many courts and
commentators have treated the Zauderer ‘reasonable relationship’ test as a highly
deferential test similar to rational basis review.”); see also Danielle Weatherby &
Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The Tobacco Control Act’s Anti-Smoking
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“finding no First Amendment infirmity in the licensed notice is
consistent with earlier Court rulings. For instance, in Zauderer we
upheld a requirement that attorneys disclose in their advertisements
that clients might be liable for significant litigation costs even if their
lawsuits were unsuccessful.”325
More broadly extrapolated, the dissent suggests that when a
professional or a business is compelled by the government to reveal
facts that possess “informational value” to patients or consumers, and
when the government “expresses no official preference” about the
choice or the option that patients or consumers should make with that
information, then “[t]here is no reason to subject such laws
to heightened scrutiny.”326 More colloquially put, a little bit of
government intervention in the factual marketplace of ideas—
intervention in the interest of helping an audience that is confronted
with important choices by expanding its knowledge—should not be
measured against a heightened test. Or phrased in terms more akin to
Breyer’s preferred proportionality method, the informational benefits
to the audience of receiving such compelled speech are major while
the harms to the speakers that result from being compelled to convey
that information are minor.327
In contrast and as noted earlier, the Becerra majority refused to
apply Zauderer.328 Why? Because, as Justice Thomas explained by
quoting directly from Zauderer, that test applies only to cases
involving disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial
information about the terms under which . . . services will be
available.”329 Specifically, Zauderer addressed the constitutionality of
a state disciplinary rule compelling Ohio attorneys to reveal in their

Regulations Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76 ALB. L. REV. 121, 138 (2012)
(writing that the Court in Zauderer “articulated a rational basis standard of review”).
325. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2386–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2387-88.
327. Id. at 2387 (“Whether the context is advertising the professional’s own
services or other commercial speech, a doctor’s First Amendment interest in not
providing factual information to patients is the same: minimal, because his
professional speech is protected precisely because of its informational value to
patients.”).
328. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (addressing the majority’s
treatment of Zauderer).
329. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
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advertisements certain information about their contingency fee
arrangements.330
Thomas distinguished that factual setting from Becerra in two
principal ways. First, he called abortion “anything but an
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”331 While he may be correct that abortion is
controversial, Thomas here slightly distorts or twists Zauderer’s
language—language that focuses not on whether the underlying topic
is uncontroversial, but on whether the information is
uncontroversial.332 In other words, while abortion may be a
controversial topic in some quarters, purely factual information
regarding the price of an abortion for low-income women is arguably
a very different matter. As Justice Breyer put it, “[a]bortion is a
controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the
availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a fact of
debatable truth.”333
The second factual distinction Justice Thomas drew in order to
cabin Zauderer’s reach to the circumstances of that case pivoted on
who provides the services about which information must be
disclosed.334 In Zauderer, attorneys had to disclose information about
the contingency fee arrangements under which they would perform
their own services for clients.335 In Becerra, however, licensed crisis
pregnancy centers had to provide information about abortion services
provided by others, given that the centers do not perform abortions.336
These two factual distinctions proved pivotal for Thomas and the
conservative majority in holding that the rational basis test created in

330. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629 (framing a key issue in the case as
“whether a State may seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring
attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee
arrangements”).
331. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
332. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added) (opining that Ohio’s
“prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in his
advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms
under which his services will be available”).
333. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
334. See id. at 2372.
335. See id. (emphasis added) (where Justice Thomas wrote that the
compelled-disclosure mandate in Zauderer applied to “lawyers who advertised their
services on a contingency-fee basis”).
336. See id. at 2371-72 (observing that California’s compelled speech
obligation regarding the availability of free or low-cost abortion services “in no way
relates to the services that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to
disclose information about state-sponsored services”).
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Zauderer was inapplicable to measure the validity of California’s law
targeting licensed centers.337
Breyer and the dissent, however, disagreed with the majority on
its who-performs-the-services logic in distinguishing Zauderer.338 For
Breyer, the key was not who directly performed the specific service in
question (abortion).339 Instead, it was whether that service was “related
to” a larger constellation of services and activities encompassing it
(pregnancy counseling and other pregnancy services).340 As Breyer
wrote, “information about state resources for family planning, prenatal
care, and abortion is related to the services that licensed clinics
provide. These clinics provide counseling about contraception (which
is a family-planning service), ultrasounds or pregnancy testing (which
is prenatal care), or abortion.”341
In brief, the majority fought hard, by raising purported factual
differences with Becerra, to hold inapplicable Zauderer’s rationalbasis exception to the general rule that content-based regulations of
speech face heightened scrutiny.342 The dissent, in contrast, embraced
Zauderer as a much more general rule—one not tightly tethered to the
facts of that case—applicable to compelled-disclosure cases involving
factual information.343
The bottom line for the dissent in Becerra was that heightened
First Amendment scrutiny was not warranted simply because speech
was involved or because the regulations were content based.344 As
Breyer put it in returning to his logic about the substantial overlap
between speech and conduct from Expressions Hair Design,345 “much,
perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech.”346 Becerra
337. See id. at 2372-73 (discussing prior precedents allowing lower levels of
scrutiny and noting why these precedents do not apply in this case).
338. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority misapplies
relevant precedent on compelled notices).
339. See id. at 2387 (arguing that disclosures requirements should not trigger
heightened scrutiny because such requirements do not prevent individuals from
communicating their ideas).
340. Id. (emphasis omitted) (discussing the wider range of services that the
clinic disclosure requirements relate to).
341. Id.
342. See id. at 2372-75 (majority opinion) (discussing why related First
Amendment cases are inapplicable to this case).
343. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that “Zauderer is not so
limited” as the majority would have it).
344. See id. (arguing that notice requirements alone should not trigger higher
First Amendment protections).
345. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
346. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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was not, as the majority dubbed it, a “speech as speech” case.347
Rather, it was a case involving “ordinary social and economic
legislation”—more specifically, “ordinary disclosure laws”
applicable, at least in the context of licensed centers, to medical
professionals performing in their professional capacities.348 As such,
the deferential standard of rational basis review embodied in
Zauderer—a case in which, as Breyer explained in Becerra, the Court
“refused to apply heightened scrutiny”349—was appropriate.
Furthermore, because a core First Amendment value such as truth
seeking in the marketplace of ideas was not jeopardized by the
legislation—in fact, Breyer argued that California’s law enhanced and
enriched the factual marketplace of ideas350—there was no reason to
ratchet up the standard of review above rational basis.351
Lurking beneath this battle over First Amendment scrutiny was
the subtext that Becerra was as much a proxy fight over access to
abortion procedures as it was a skirmish over the right not to be
compelled by the government to speak. As Adam Liptak wrote for the
New York Times, “[w]hile the decision’s legal analysis turned on the
First Amendment, it was lost on no one that the justices most
committed to defending abortion rights were all in dissent.”352 Put
differently, the dispute over speech was a surrogate for a larger
political and legal battle over abortion rights.353
Only two years prior to Becerra, the Court’s liberal members
(Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan and
Sonia Sotomayor), along with Justice Kennedy, declared
unconstitutional in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt two Texas
regulations limiting access to abortions in the Lone Star State.354 In
contrast, conservative Justice Clarence Thomas filed a solo dissent and
347. Id. at 2374 (majority opinion).
348. Id. at 2380-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 2386-87.
350. See id. at 2388 (contending that the marketplace of ideas “is fostered, not
hindered, by providing information to patients to enable them to make fully informed
medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies”).
351. See id. at 2387-88 (discussing the importance of the different ideas and
viewpoints to First Amendment analysis and arguing that rational basis review should
have been applied in this case).
352. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Backs Anti-Abortion Pregnancy Centers in
Free Speech Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-crisis-pregnancy-center-abortion.html
[https://perma.cc/29HS-2MBF].
353. See id. (noting the political debate present in this case).
354. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299-300 (2016).
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conservative Justice Samuel Alito, joined by conservative Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, also penned a
dissent.355 The conservatives were caught shorthanded in Hellerstedt.
That’s because Justice Antonin Scalia—a vehement opponent of the
federal constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion356—had
died in February 2016 and was not replaced until April 2017 by
conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch.357
The contrasting views on scrutiny in Becerra were thus arguably
part of a larger battle over abortion rights. The conservatives prevailed
this time in a ruling favoring pro-life organizations (the operators of
crisis pregnancy centers).358 Kennedy voted with the liberals in
Hellerstedt where no First Amendment issue was involved.359 He came
back, however, to join the conservative bloc in Becerra in which he
perceived California, via its own speech, was taking sides on
abortion.360 As Kennedy explained in a concurrence joined by Roberts,
Alito, and Gorsuch:
[California] requires primarily pro-life pregnancy centers to promote the
State’s own preferred message advertising abortions. This compels
individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in
basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these. And the
history of the Act’s passage and its underinclusive application suggest a real
possibility that these individuals were targeted because of their beliefs.361

The fact that abortion was the subject matter about which the
regulated speech dealt clearly made a difference for the majority.362 To
wit, Justice Thomas, in writing for the majority, focused on the fact
that abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic’” when
rebuffing the argument that Zauderer’s rational basis test should
355. See id. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
356. See Lyle Denniston, Rehnquist to Roberts: The “Reagan Revolution”
Fulfilled?, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 63, 69 (2006) (identifying Justices Scalia and Thomas
as “implacable foes of abortion”).
357. See Benjamin Pomerance, Inside a House Divided: Recent Alliances on
the United States Supreme Court, 81 ALB. L. REV. 361, 361, 364 (2017) (noting
Scalia’s death and Gorsuch’s confirmation).
358. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2378 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing that the compelled notices violated
freedom of speech).
359. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2299-300 (holding Texas laws
unconstitutional because they are undue burdens on abortion).
360. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (viewing
the law as impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination).
361. Id. at 2379
362. See id. at 2375 (majority opinion) (discussing how the California’s
license requirement infringes freedom of speech).
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apply.363 He also invoked the marketplace of ideas metaphor.364
Thomas even went so far as to quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
nearly century-old, seminal articulation of it in Abrams v. United
States.365 Thomas did so to make it clear that California had no right
to intervene and manipulate the speech market on a topic such as
abortion where “[p]rofessionals might have a host of good-faith
disagreements, both with each other and with the government.”366 In
brief, as Thomas wrote, “California cannot co-opt the licensed
facilities to deliver its message for it.”367 Yet, as if tipping his hand that
the underlying subject matter of abortion made a key difference in
ramping up scrutiny to stop California from delivering its message,
Thomas added that “we do not question the legality of health and
safety warnings long considered permissible.”368
For the dissent, abortion also made a difference.369 That’s
because, as Justice Breyer explained, it simply was not fair for the
Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
to allow the government to mandate that doctors discuss adoption
options while, in Becerra, not allowing California to provide
information about free and low-cost abortion services.370 As Breyer
wrote:
If a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion
about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require a
medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other
363. Id. at 2372.
364. See id. at 2374-75.
365. See id. at 2375; see generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). Holmes wrote in dissent in Abrams that:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas–that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Professor Howard Wasserman encapsulates the
importance of this language, writing that “Holmes arguably invented modern freedom
of speech in his Abrams dissent, promoting constitutional primacy for speech in
matters of public concern and protection for dissenting ideas so they can be tested and
seek to prevail in the marketplace of ideas.” Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and
Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 798 (2016).
366. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374-75.
367. Id. at 2376.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 2385. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
370. See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services? As the
question suggests, there is no convincing reason to distinguish between
information about adoption and information about abortion in this context.
After all, the rule of law embodies evenhandedness . . . .371

In summary, the Becerra majority applied its content-basedversus-content-neutral framework to hold that heightened First
Amendment scrutiny applied to measure the validity of the FACT
Act’s compelled speech provision affecting licensed clinics.372 The
majority rebutted arguments that any exception to that general rule—
namely, that content-based laws trigger heightened scrutiny—
applied.373 For the dissent, the compelled disclosure by a professional
acting in his or her professional capacity of purely factual information
that can help a person make a better-informed choice about an
important matter merited only rational basis review.374 In the dissent’s
estimation, no First Amendment value was sufficiently endangered by
California’s law to justify a more intense level of scrutiny.375
C. Janus
The day after the Court ruled in Becerra, it handed down another
five-to-four decision in Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, & Municipal Employees, with the justices again clustering
into conservative and liberal camps.376 Of central importance for this
Article, the justices disagreed over whether the law at issue—an
Illinois statute compelling public employees who are not members of
the union that exclusively represents them in collective bargaining to
pay agency fees to that union—merited heightened First Amendment
review.377
In concluding both that heightened scrutiny applied and that the
law violated the First Amendment, Justice Alito reasoned for the
371. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
372. See id. at 2371 (majority opinion).
373. See id. at 2371-72.
374. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
375. See id.
376. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n St., Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018).
377. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/6(e) (2013). An agency fee “amounts to a
percentage of the union dues.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. Under the Illinois statute at
issue in the case, agency fees were chargeable to nonunion members for union
activities including “the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract
administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of
employment.” 315/6(e).

126

Michigan State Law Review

2019

conservative majority that “[f]undamental free speech rights are at
stake” and that “the compelled subsidization of private speech
seriously impinges on First Amendment rights.”378 That logic
simultaneously gave life to the heart of petitioner Mark Janus’s central
argument—that he should not be compelled to pay, via agency fees,
for the union’s speech activities with which he disagreed, “including
the positions it takes in collective bargaining”379—and dealt a death
blow to the Court’s precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.380 In Abood, the Court held that a non-union member could
be compelled to pay a fee for collective-bargaining activities but not
for “ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.”381
In explaining the need for heightened scrutiny in Janus, Alito
went so far as to suggest that laws compelling speech—or, more
precisely in this instance, compelling the subsidization of speech—are
actually more dangerous than laws stopping one from speaking.382
“When speech is compelled . . . additional damage is done. In that
situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions,”
Alito wrote.383 He added that “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the
speech of other private speakers raises similar First Amendment
concerns.”384
Alito also rebuffed the AFSCME’s argument that rational basis
supplied the appropriate level of scrutiny.385 He derided that standard
as a “form of minimal scrutiny . . . foreign to our free-speech
jurisprudence, and we reject it here.”386 Put differently, some form of
heightened First Amendment scrutiny was required in Janus. The
question therefore became what heightened standard should apply.
Much as the conservative majority did in Becerra where it found
it unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny because the law there could not
pass muster under the laxer intermediate scrutiny test,387 the majority
in Janus said it did not need to use strict scrutiny because the agency378. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460, 2464.
379. Id. at 2461-62 (“The amended complaint claims that all ‘nonmember fee
deductions are coerced political speech’ and that ‘the First Amendment forbids
coercing any money from the nonmembers.’”).
380. See generally Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
381. Id. at 236.
382. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
383. Id.
384. Id. (emphasis in original).
385. See id. at 2465.
386. Id.
387. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2378 (2018)
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fee requirement could not survive what Alito called a “more
permissive standard.”388 That standard was what Alito called exacting
scrutiny.389 Under it, the government must prove that: 1) it has a
compelling interest in mandating the subsidization of private speech;
and 2) alternative means of serving that interest do not exist that are
“significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”390
The first prong of this test mirrors strict scrutiny, as it requires
the government to prove a compelling interest.391 The second prong,
however, is slightly more relaxed than strict scrutiny, which requires
the government to adopt “the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest.”392 Exacting scrutiny therefore appears to
fall somewhere between strict and intermediate scrutiny,393 with the
latter typically requiring only a significant government interest rather
than a compelling one.394
Unfortunately, the Court sometimes uses the phrase exacting
scrutiny synonymously with strict scrutiny, as the plurality did in
United States v. Alvarez, thereby muddling the precise nature of
exacting scrutiny.395 Indeed, as Professor David Han recently wrote,
388. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
389. See id.
390. Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)).
391. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011)
(emphasis added) (noting that a law is invalid under strict scrutiny unless “it is
justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest”).
392. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (emphasis added).
393. See R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L.
REV. 207, 210 (2016) (describing an “understandable temptation to think of exacting
scrutiny, as formulated above, as occupying a position between strict scrutiny and
either intermediate or minimum scrutiny”).
394. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“In order
to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.’” (quoting McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529))).
395. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 711 (2012). Writing for the
plurality in Alvarez, Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that the Stolen Valor Act
was a content-based restriction of speech and thus was subject to review under
“exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 715. In applying that level of scrutiny, however, the
majority used language closely linked with strict scrutiny. See id. at 711. It wrote, for
example, that “to recite the Government’s compelling interests is not to end the
matter.” Id. at 725 (emphasis added). It also observed that “when the Government
seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the ‘least restrictive means
among available, effective alternatives.’” Id. at 729 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 656, 666 (2004)). The blurring of the line between strict and exacting scrutiny in
Alvarez has been recognized by other scholars. See, e.g., Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud
and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How United States
v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L.
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the Court’s use of the term exacting scrutiny is “opaque and
inconsistent.”396 Using exacting scrutiny as a fourth level of scrutiny—
one in addition to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational
basis review—thus contributes to the scrutiny commotion at the heart
of this Article. Regardless of the precise contours of exacting scrutiny,
however, the Janus majority was clear that the Illinois statute could
not surmount them.397
The Janus dissent objected to the majority’s application of
exacting scrutiny.398 In doing so and as described below, it focused less
on the First Amendment speech rights of public employees like Mark
Janus and more on the government’s interest in effectively and
efficiently managing those employees in the name of workplace
operations.399
Justice Kagan, writing on behalf of herself and Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, asserted that the Court’s precedents
provide government entities with “substantial latitude to regulate their
employees’ speech—especially about terms of employment—in the
interest of operating their workplaces effectively.”400 Therefore, rather
than deploying a heightened level of scrutiny when the government
plays the role of employer and regulates its employees’ speech to
facilitate “workplace operations” and to “protect its managerial
interests,” the Court owes the government “great deference.”401 As
Kagan wrote:
So long as the government is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting
the employment relationship for other ends—it has a wide berth,
comparable to that of a private employer. And when the regulated
expression concerns the terms and conditions of employment—the very
stuff of the employment relationship—the government really cannot lose.402

REV. 566, 588-89 (2014) (“In Alvarez, once the Court found that the Stolen Valor Act
was a content-based restriction on speech, it was subjected to ‘exacting scrutiny,’
which functionally appears to be similar to strict scrutiny.”); see also John D. Moore,
The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1,
33 n.203 (2014) (observing that in Alvarez, Justice Kennedy’s use of “‘exacting
scrutiny’ seems to bear the hallmarks of strict scrutiny”).
396. David S. Han, Categorizing Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 613, 635 (2018).
397. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2465 (2018) (holding that “the Illinois scheme cannot survive under even the more
permissive standard” of exacting scrutiny).
398. See id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
399. See id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 2492-93, 2493 n.2.
402. Id. at 2493.

Is Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case?

129

In brief, the law affecting speech in Janus was simply an
example of “workaday economic and regulatory policy.”403 Janus was
not a speech-as-speech case because—and in accord with Justice
Breyer’s observations in both Expressions Hair Design404 and
Becerra405 about the blurring of the line between speech and conduct—
“[s]peech is everywhere” and therefore “almost all economic and
regulatory policy affects or touches speech,” Kagan opined.406
The proper standard of review, at least for the dissent, was that
developed in a line of public-employee workplace speech cases.407
This standard is deferential to the government408 and sometimes is seen
as akin to rational basis review.409 The three key cases are Pickering v.
Board of Education,410 Connick v. Myers,411 and Garcetti v.
Ceballos.412 As clarified in Garcetti, it is a two-part test that first asks
if a public employee is speaking out in his or her role as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.413 If the answer is no, then the government
wins and censorship of the employee’s speech does not raise any First
Amendment issues.414 If the answer is yes, then the public employee’s
speech can still be censored, but the government must prove that its
403. Id. at 2501.
404. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch, perhaps most, human behavior takes
place through speech.”); supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
405. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch, perhaps
most, human behavior takes place through speech.”).
406. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
407. See id. at 2491-93.
408. See Erin Daly, Garcetti in Delaware: New Limits on Public Employees’
Speech, 11 DEL. L. REV. 23, 23 (2009). As Professor Erin Daly succinctly explains it:
In balancing the free speech rights of individuals against the ability of a
government employer to control the workplace, the United States Supreme
Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, has come down squarely on the side of
the government. Garcetti v. Ceballos is the most recent salvo in a spate of
cases spanning 40 years that has addressed this issue, and it is the most
restrictive of the speech of public employees and the most deferential of
employers.
Id.
409. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment Right—PostHeller Standard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 48 (2009) (“In Garcetti v. Ceballos,
without explicitly saying so, the Court applied rational basis to reject a government
employee’s free-speech claim where the speech was made in furtherance of the
employee’s official duties.”).
410. See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
411. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
412. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
413. See id. at 418.
414. See id.
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censorship is “directed at speech that has some potential to affect [the
government entity’s] operations.”415 As interpreted by Justice Kagan
in Janus, this last requirement simply means that the government
“needs to show that legitimate workplace interests lay behind the
speech regulation.”416
Applying this test to the facts of Janus, Kagan and the dissent
had no problem finding that speech about collective bargaining and
the terms and conditions of employment—the same topics about
which Illinois compelled nonunion members such as Mark Janus to
subsidize speech—are not matters of public concern.417 Instead, such
expression is “about and directed to the workplace.”418 As Kagan
summed it up, “[i]f an employee’s speech is about, in, and directed to
the workplace, she has no ‘possibility of a First Amendment claim.’”419
In brief, Mark Janus loses his case under this form of scrutiny.
The dissent’s anger at the majority’s sharpening of the scrutiny
scalpel to strike down decisions affecting workplace operations made
by duly elected legislative bodies like the ones in Illinois was palpable
in Janus. As Kagan bluntly put it, the majority had turned “the First
Amendment into a sword,” “weaponizing” it to use in “such an
aggressive way” that the justices are being transformed into “blackrobed rulers overriding citizens’ choices” as they “intervene in
economic and regulatory policy.”420 In other words, an unelected
judiciary is unnecessarily intruding into the province of the legislature,
disturbing the balance of powers between those two branches of
government and ignoring traditional principles of deference in the
process.421
Kagan also criticized the majority’s argument that heightened
scrutiny was warranted because laws compelling speech are somehow
more harmful than laws censoring speech.422 The majority’s
contention “lack[ed] force,”423 Kagan explained, because it relied on
an anomalous case with a radically different set of facts—namely,

415. Id. at 411, 418.
416. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
417. See id. at 2495-96.
418. Id. at 2495.
419. Id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418).
420. Id. at 2501-02.
421. See id.
422. See id. at 2464 (majority opinion); id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,424 and a law
requiring public school children to salute the American flag and recite
the pledge of allegiance.425 Janus, instead, was about the compelled
subsidization of the speech of others in an employment context and
thus actually merited a lower level of scrutiny.426
In addition to Justice Kagan’s dissent on behalf of all of the
liberal justices, Justice Sotomayor issued a brief solo dissent in
Janus.427 In it, she objected to how the Court’s decision in Sorrell was
being used aggressively in cases such as Becerra.428 As described
earlier, Sotomayor had joined—as the lone liberal—with the
conservatives in the majority in Sorrell.429
CONCLUSION
Professor Leslie Kendrick recently asserted that “the fact that a
law implicates ‘speech’ does not mean that it implicates ‘the freedom
of speech.’”430 Her observation crisply captures the fissure between the
conservative majorities and liberal dissents in 2018 in Becerra and
Janus.431
For the conservatives, both cases directly implicated the First
Amendment freedom of speech and thus required a level of scrutiny
greater than rational basis review. For the liberals, both cases also
involved speech, but only within the context of workaday economic
and social regulations, thereby not warranting heightened review.
Although all of the justices seemingly agree today that heightened
First Amendment scrutiny applies when a statute affecting

424. See generally West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
425. See id. at 626.
426. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And if anything, the
First Amendment scales tip the opposite way when (as here) the government is not
compelling actual speech, but instead compelling a subsidy that others will use for
expression.”).
427. See id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
428. See id.
429. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658-59 (identifying the
justices in the majority in Sorrell).
430. Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the “Speech” in “Freedom of
Speech” 116 MICH. L. REV. 667, 676 (2018).
431. See id.
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nongovernmental speech432 is viewpoint based,433 everything else is
much more fluid. Justice Breyer’s bendable proportionality approach
greases the skids for intensified ambiguity,434 while Sorrell provides a
wrecking ball for conservatives to destroy the walls separating
customary levels of scrutiny.435
Viewed at a macro level, the conservatives generally focus on
whether a statute is content based, content neutral, or targets specific
speakers to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny.436 The liberals,
432. The government speech doctrine, which applies when the government—
not a private person or private entity—is the speaker, provides an exception to the rule
that viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny review. That
is because the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment only “restricts government
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.” Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); see also Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of
Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) (“When government speaks, it is
not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.”).
The Court explained in 2017 that:
[I]mposing a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on government speech
would be paralyzing. When a government entity embarks on a course of
action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others. The
Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint
neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
433. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2381 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rebuking the majority opinion in Becerra for
saying “nothing about limiting its language to the kind of instance where the Court
has traditionally found the First Amendment wary of content-based laws, namely, in
cases of viewpoint discrimination”); Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (asserting, in a concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, that viewpoint discrimination constitutes “a form
of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional
scrutiny”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (opining that strict scrutiny always applies when a “regulation facially
differentiates on the basis of viewpoint”); Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2256-63 (2015) (Alito,
J., dissenting) (asserting, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, that a Texas statute affecting specialty license
plates allowed the state to engage in “blatant viewpoint discrimination,” noting that
Texas’s rationale for the statute “cannot withstand strict scrutiny,” and adding that
“Texas cannot forbid private speech based on its viewpoint”).
434. See supra Part II (discussing Breyer’s proportionality approach).
435. For instance, Justice Kagan wrote in 2018 in Janus that the Court in
Sorrell “wielded the First Amendment in . . . an aggressive way.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n
State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501-02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately in Janus to express her agreement with Kagan’s
sentiment about Sorrell, adding that “I disagree with the way that this Court has since
interpreted and applied that opinion.” Id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
436. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)
(noting that “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
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on the other hand, increasingly concentrate on whether the regulated
speech serves an important value or purpose for which the First
Amendment exists in order to decide the correct standard of judicial
review.437
Along the way, questions of whether a law’s impact on speech
is something more than “incidental” come into play for the Court’s
conservative justices.438 The liberal justices, especially Breyer, place
less emphasis on the speech-versus-conduct dichotomy.439 They
assume speech is inextricably bound up in most types of conduct,440
and therefore judicial effort is better expended ferreting out whether
the speech serves a vital First Amendment value.441 If for the
conservatives “incidental” is an elastic term to exploit as needed, then
for the liberals the concept of the “true value” of protecting speech,
along with reserving elevated First Amendment review only for
“better things,” play equally flexible roles.442
Free speech jurisprudence regarding the applicable level of
scrutiny in any given case sits at a crossroads after Becerra and Janus.
The justices, of course, have options about which direction to take. For
instance, should they continue to use the content-based law versus
content-neutral law formula for determining the appropriate level of
scrutiny?443 It is an imperfect approach that, as the Court observed

simply a means to control content,” and adding that “[q]uite apart from the purpose
or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a
constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers”).
437. See supra notes 216-224 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing the
consideration of whether a burden imposed on speech is incidental).
439. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152
(2017) (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that “it is often wiser not to try to distinguish
between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct’”).
440. See id. (asserting that “virtually all government regulation affects speech.
Human relations take place through speech. And human relations include community
activities of all kinds—commercial and otherwise”); see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Speech is everywhere—a part of every human activity
(employment, health care, securities trading, you name it).”); Nat’l Inst. of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(contending that “much, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech”).
441. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring).
442. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at
2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
443. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (addressing the contentbased versus content neutral law approach).
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twenty-five years ago, is not always simple.444 What’s more, the Court
has long carved out exceptions, via tools such as the commercial
speech doctrine445 and the secondary effects doctrine, from the general
rule that content-based laws are evaluated under strict scrutiny.446
Furthermore, legal scholars over the years have identified a “broad
range of problems associated with the distinction between contentbased and content-neutral speech regulations.”447
A second option is to let the value served by the speech in
question—facilitating democratic self-governance,448 discovering the
truth about matters of public concern,449 or perhaps advancing some
other value450—determine the level of scrutiny. This approach is

444. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding
whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a
simple task.”).
445. See supra note 117 (noting that laws targeting commercial speech are
subject to intermediate scrutiny review).
446. See Fee, supra note 60, at 292 (noting that the secondary effects doctrine
“provides that a regulation will be treated as content-neutral and subject to
intermediate scrutiny, despite its content-discriminatory form, if the primary purpose
of the regulation is to control the secondary effects rather than the primary effects of
speech”); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis
After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 385, 386 (2017) (noting that
“facially content-sensitive government actions” targeting sexually oriented businesses
are treated under a secondary effects analysis with a more deferential level of review
under intermediate scrutiny).
447. R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of
Speech: A Distinction That is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2085
(2015).
448. See Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Community: Reply to Bender, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 495 (1997) (asserting “that the value of democratic selfgovernance is the most powerful explanation of the general pattern of First
Amendment decisions . . . [and] democratic self-governance is the only value that can
convincingly account for the specific set of decisions protecting the abusive,
outrageous and indecent speech”); see also Eugene Volokh, Response: In Defense of
the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97
VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (writing that “a broad vision of democratic selfgovernment is one important justification for free speech”).
449. See Post, supra note 75, at 2363 (“The theory of the marketplace of ideas
focuses on ‘the truth-seeking function’ of the First Amendment.”).
450. Scholars have offered many reasons over the years why it is important to
protect expression under the First Amendment. Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 274 (1999)
(“The freedoms of speech and press . . . are said to promote and to protect discovery
of truth, democratic self-governance, self-realization, dissent, tolerance, and honest
government.”).
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intimated by the dissents in both Becerra451 and Janus.452 It also
reverberates in former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post’s
observation that “First Amendment analysis is relevant only when the
values served by the First Amendment are implicated.”453
Under this methodology, heightened First Amendment
scrutiny—be it strict or intermediate—would only apply when some
higher-level value (on a First Amendment hierarchy of values) is
served by the speech being regulated. Thus, the justices would need to
agree on and establish a clear hierarchy of First Amendment values
for this approach to function in a consistent and coherent manner.
Without an agreed-upon hierarchy of values, the subjectivity of this
approach would undermine confidence in its application.
A pure values-based approach would also call into question—or
at least call for revisiting—a host of cases where some level of
heightened scrutiny was applied but where the value of the speech
seemingly had nothing to do with lofty ideals such as truth discovery
or voting wisely in a self-governing democracy.454 As noted in the
Introduction, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to protect
minors’ access to violent video games455 and it applies intermediate
scrutiny to judge the constitutionality of laws regulating sexually
oriented businesses.456 Under a value-based methodology for
discerning the correct level of scrutiny in these scenarios, it seems that
rational basis review might be more appropriate.
A third route is to jettison a distinct levels-of-scrutiny approach
and instead apply Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach in all
cases affecting speech.457 Under this tack, which is embraced in many

451. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
452. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
453. Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1255 (1995).
454. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 25 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2004) (1948) (suggesting that the
ultimate aim of free speech “is the voting of wise decisions,” and contending that
voters “must be made as wise as possible”).
455. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (addressing the Supreme
Court’s deployment of strict scrutiny in Brown v. Entn’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786
(2011)).
456. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (addressing the use of
intermediate scrutiny in cases involving the zoning of sexually oriented businesses).
457. See supra Part II (discussing Breyer’s proportionality approach).
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countries,458 the Court would use a balancing methodology.459 It would
weigh anew in each case whether the burdens imposed on speech are
disproportionate to the beneficial consequences of regulating it.460
Gone would be the separate tests of strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis review in cases affecting speech. Such
tests, if they had use at all, would become, in Breyer’s judicial world,
merely “guidelines.”461 Yet proportionality itself is subject to
criticism.462 Additionally, whether four other justices would go along
with a proportionality framework remains to be seen, although Justice
Kagan’s concurrence in Reed v. Town of Gilbert—a concurrence
joined by Justice Breyer—intimates that she too might embrace it.463
Kagan also joined Breyer’s concurrence attacking a rigid levels-ofscrutiny approach in United States v. Alvarez.464
A fourth possibility is for the Court to develop well-defined tests
for determining what constitutes both an “incidental” burden on
speech465 and an instance of ordinary or workaday economic and social
458. Grant Huscroft, Proportionality and Pretense, 29 CONST. COMMENTARY
229, 229 (2014) (reviewing Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and
Their Limitations (2012)) (“Proportionality is an analytical framework used by courts
in many countries in determining whether or not limitations on the exercise of rights
are justified, and therefore constitutional.”).
459. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?
American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799
(2011) (observing that proportionality is “an analytical procedure with balancing at
its core”).
460. See id. at 802.
461. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
462. For example, Professor Bernhard Schlink notes that a major problem with
proportionality is that “balancing of rights, interests, and values entailed in the
analysis of appropriateness is unavoidably subjective. There is no objective standard
for measuring and weighing free speech vs. privacy, freedom vs. safety, privacy vs.
public health, or the protection of an endangered species vs. the creation of badly
needed jobs.” Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why
Everywhere but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 299 (2012).
463. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236, 2238-39 (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (2015) (observing that “[o]ur cases have been far less rigid than the
majority admits in applying strict scrutiny to facially content-based laws,” contending
that “we may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely reasonable’ laws imperiled
by strict scrutiny can survive,” and concluding that “there is no need to decide in this
case whether strict scrutiny applies to every sign ordinance in every town across this
country containing a subject-matter exemption”).
464. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730-31 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
465. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing the
incidental burden issue).
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regulation.466 As addressed above, the incidental burden standard is
pivotal for some justices in deciding whether something greater than
rational basis review applies to a regulation of speech.467 Similarly, the
dissents in both Becerra and Janus make it evident that rational basis
review applies to ordinary economic and social regulations that
involve speech.468 If the concepts of an incidental burden and ordinary
economic and social regulation provide the pivotal yardsticks for
determining when rational basis review is relevant, then those
concepts must be better defined. Furthermore, accompanying tests for
determining when a burden is incidental and when a law is ordinary
economic and social regulation must be articulated.
As for now, however, it is clear from Sorrell, Becerra, and Janus
that the justices simply cannot always agree when a heightened
standard of scrutiny applies in a case involving expression.469 If, to use
466. See supra notes 29, 40, 42, 62-63, 128-135, 318, 403 and accompanying
text (discussing the concepts of ordinary and/or workaday economic and social
legislation).
467. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (addressing the
incidental burden issue). Writing more than thirty years ago, Professor Geoffrey Stone
explained the Court’s general methodology regarding incidental burdens. As he put
it:
[T]he Court’s approach to incidental restrictions reflects an effort to avoid
endless inquiries into incidental effect while at the same time invalidating
those restrictions that most seriously threaten free expression. The general
presumption is that incidental restrictions do not raise a question of First
Amendment review. The presumption is waived, however, whenever an
incidental restriction either has a highly disproportionate impact on free
expression or directly penalizes expressive activity. And the latter exception
is applied quite liberally whenever the challenged restriction significantly
limits the opportunities for free expression. It is an uneasy but not
unprincipled compromise.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 114 (1987).
468. See supra notes 29, 40, 42, 62, 128-135 and accompanying text
(discussing the concept of ordinary economic and social legislation).
469. This Article focuses on cases in which the justices could not agree on
whether some level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny—be it a variation of
either strict or intermediate scrutiny—applies or whether only rational basis review is
appropriate. There are, of course, other relatively recent First Amendment speech
cases in which the justices also could not agree on the correct standard of scrutiny.
See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that a contentbased sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it could not survive strict scrutiny
but including concurring opinions penned by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan that
openly questioned the merits of applying strict scrutiny and suggesting it was
unnecessary to apply that rigorous level of review); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct.
2518 (2014) (involving the constitutionality of a statute restricting speech outside of
facilities that perform abortions and featuring the Court fracturing over scrutiny, with
five justices finding the statute was content neutral and therefore applying
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Justice Kagan’s provocative phrasing, the conservatives are
“weaponizing the First Amendment”470 by needlessly—and
harmfully—ratcheting up the level of scrutiny in these cases and using
the amendment as what Professor Stanley Fish once called “a political
instrument,”471 then perhaps the liberals may be seen (equally as
provocative) as trying to neuter the First Amendment by only
elevating scrutiny in cases where core free-speech values are
jeopardized. Regardless of which side is right, today’s conflict over
scrutiny and what constitutes a true speech-as-speech case meriting
heightened review leaves First Amendment jurisprudence in even
greater disarray than it was before.472 The justices now dial up or dial
down the level of scrutiny almost at will, deciding on and picking a
specific level that allows them to uphold or strike down a law as they
so desire.

intermediate scrutiny, three justices finding it was content based and thus applying
strict scrutiny, and one justice finding the law was viewpoint based and therefore
automatically unconstitutional).
470. Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
471. Stanley Fish, Colloquy: Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 883, 891 (1997) (“This brings me to a final point, one I have made in other
venues: the First Amendment is a political instrument; not an apolitical principle to
which you can be faithful or unfaithful.”).
472. See Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of
Free Speech Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 131, 133 (2010) (contending that
“many free speech doctrines appear incoherent”); Post, supra note 453, at 1249-50
(asserting that “contemporary First Amendment doctrine is . . . striking chiefly for its
superficiality, its internal incoherence, its distressing failure to facilitate constructive
judicial engagement with significant contemporary social issues connected with
freedom of speech”).

